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Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation is to determine what 
factors account for variations in voter turnout in Louisiana 
contested nonpartisan trial and intermediate appellate court 
elections. The central questions to be addressed are; (1) 
what is the precise relationship between incumbency or prior 
judicial experience, campaign spending, and the race of 
judicial candidates, ceteris paribus (with all else 
remaining the same), on electoral participation in judicial 
elections in the State of Louisiana from 1981 to 1988 and 
(2) is the electorate that participates in judicial 
elections typical or atypical of the electorate that 
participates in presidential general races in terms of their 
demographic characteristics?
Based upon my assessment of existing literature on 
state nonpartisan judicial elections, the present research 
adds considerably to what has not been explained with 
regards to factors which may influence voter turnout in 
these elections. Existing literature indicate that much 
research needs to be conducted on the subject of state 
judicial elections. Voter turnout in judicial elections has 
almost been ignored by scholars who have focused their 
attentions on electoral participation in major partisan 
contests such as presidential, congressional, or 
gubernatorial. Furthermore, researchers who have considered 
voter turnout in judicial elections have focused their
vi
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attentions on electoral participation in state supreme court 
elections. This dissertation represents my attempt to fill 
the void which exists in the literature on voter turnout in 
state trial and intermediate appellate court elections.
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Chapter One 
Introduction
With but a few exceptions, scholars have not conducted 
research to explain variations in electoral participation or 
voter turnout in judicial elections. Instead scholars have 
devoted their attentions to analyzing voter participation in 
congressional and presidential elections (Verba and Nie 
1972; Niemi and Weisberg 1976; Nie et al. 1976; Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone 1980; Shaffer 1981; Conway 1981; Hinkley 
1981a, 1981b; Caldeira and Patterson 1982; Burnham 1982; 
Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Copeland 1983). These scholars 
have examined the effects of motivational, contextual, and 
legal factors on whether or not a person votes.
Scholars have also devised rational actor models to 
explain variations in voter turnout in elections (Downs 
1957; Riker and Oidershook 1968; Cyr 1975; Kastosh and 
Traugott 1982; Foster 1984). These researchers sought to 
explain why people choose to vote or not to vote in American 
elections. Of these models, the rational actor model of 
Downs (1957) is most well-known. According to Downs, people 
choose to vote because they perceive their vote as having an 
impact on the outcome of elections. In a similar vein,
Riker and Oidershook (1968) devised the calculus of voting 
model in which they argued that people are rational actors 
who weigh the benefits and costs of voting before deciding
1
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2to participate in elections. In other words, if voters 
believe the benefits of voting outweigh the costs of voting, 
they are more likely to go to the polls and vote. Not only 
has research revealed that voters do a cost-benefit analysis 
when deciding whether or not to vote, voting has also been 
examined in terms of its instrumental and expressive 
benefits. According to Wolfinger and Rosenstone <1980, 76), 
"an example of an instrumental benefit is those people who 
vote because they are paid to do so. Expressive benefits 
involve equating voting with a feeling of carrying out one’s 
civic duty. "
Other scholars have disputed the findings of Downs and 
Riker and Oidershook. Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) 
introduced the "paradox of not voting" in their research. 
According to these researchers, it is negligible that a 
single vote will be decisive in even competitive elections. 
They also emphasize that a direct relationship does not 
exist between the closeness of elections and turnout.
Despite the findings revealed in these studies of 
turnout for national offices, little research has been 
devoted to explaining variations in electoral participation 
in judicial elections. For this reason, the present study 
is devoted to examining the factors which may stimulate or 
depress voter turnout in judicial elections.
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3Importance of Judicial Election Studies
The lack of scholarly attention devoted to analyzing 
judicial elections cannot be attributed to the traditional 
view held by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers,
N o . 78 (1788) that the Supreme Court or the judiciary would 
be the "least dangerous branch" of the federal government. 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1961, 2) provided a more accurate 
view of the role of the judiciary when he stated that 
"scarcely any political question arises in the United States 
that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial 
question."
It is important to emphasize that researchers have not 
completely ignored the importance of the judiciary in 
American society. For example, scholars have examined 
judicial behavior or decision-making (Nagel 1962; Woodford 
1977; Goldman and Sarat 1978; Miller 1978; Spaeth 1979; Tate
1981) and its impact on public policy. The previous comment 
requires one to differentiate between research on judicial 
behavior, in general, and that of judicial elections.
As previously stated, the role of the judiciary in the 
American political system has not been completely ignored by 
scholars. The argument I put forward is that trial and 
intermediate appellate judicial elections, particularly 
nonpartisan district court elections, have for the most part 
not received scholarly attention because they have not been
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
4viewed in the same light as legislative races for four main 
reasons.
The first explanation has to do with the view that 
legislators represent the people and judges may not. Two of 
the main functions of members of Congress are providing 
services to constituents and the representation of diverse 
interests (Fiorina 1977; Arnold 1979; Parker 1980; Bond 
1985; Parker and Parker 1985). Services to constituents are 
considered casework or personal work members of Congress 
perform for their constituents. The importance of casework 
to the elections of Congresspersons has been pointed out by 
Fenno (1978). Like Fenno, Fiorina (1974) and Bond (1985) 
argue that the activities or services members of Congress, 
particularly House members, provide for their constituents 
help to build a relationship of trust between the 
legislators and their constituents.
Another role of members of Congress is representation 
of the views of their constituents. Wahlke et al. (1962) 
coined terms to explain the representational function of 
legislators. According to these scholars, legislators’ 
perceptions of their role determine how they carry out their 
duties. The first view of representation, according to the 
authors, is the trustee view— the legislator "claims to rely 
on his own conscience on what he thinks is right" (286-87). 
In contrast to the trustee view is the instructed—delegate 
view of representation. This view is based on legislators
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5"seek(ing) and follow(ing) instructions from his 
constituents or other clienteles" (1962, 286). Wahlke et 
al. (1962) concluded that legislators did not perceive their 
roles as a pure trustee nor a pure instructed-delegate. The 
authors referred to this representational role as politico 
in which the legislator "claim that he will adopt one or the 
other orientation (trustee or instructed-delegate) as 
conditions call for, and that he must balance one against 
the other (Wahlke et al. 1962, 286).
According to Jewell (1969, 1982) in his examination of 
state legislatures, "role is defined by the total pattern of 
expectations concerning a position, including those of the 
person occupying that position. The role of a legislator is 
defined by his own belief about what the job requires and 
also by the expectations of all others who make demands on 
him" (1969, 84). The author referred to Wahlke et al.
(1962) concepts of "trustee" and "delegate." Jewell 
considered these concepts part of the representational role 
of legislators. He defined the representational role as 
"the degree to which they (legislators) feel obliged to rely 
on their own judgment in making decisions" (1969, 90).
Jewell also defined the "client" role of legislators. The 
"client" role defines his (legislator) relationship with the 
various groups that make demands on him— including his 
party, the executive branch, his constituents, and interest 
groups (1969, 90).
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6Davidson’s (1969, 117) sampling of members of Congress 
demonstrated that about the same proportion endorsed the 
trustee (28 percent) and delegate (23 percent) approaches to 
representation, but the clear preference was for the 
politico position— which combines the perspectives of both 
the trustee and the delegate in a pragmatic mix.
The question of representation by judges surfaced as a 
result of challenges to judicial election systems. The 
important question is: are judges actually representatives
of the people or do they serve different functions than that 
of other elected officials? Because judges rely upon 
written laws and statutes when reaching their decisions, 
judges may be viewed as being different from other public 
officials. Judges have not been traditionally viewed as 
representatives of the people (Vines 1969; Flango et al. 
1975; Abraham 1975; Goldman and Sarat 1978; White 1978; Ely 
1980; Pruet and Click 1986; Haydel 1989; Hickok 1990).
According to Pitkin (1967), there are two types of 
representation. Descriptive representation refers to the 
election of public officials who reflect the ethnic, racial, 
and socioeconomic characteristics of the election district. 
Substantive representation refers to the policy alternatives 
preferred by these elected officials and whether they 
reflect the needs and demands of the voters (Pitkin 1967, 
60-91). Minorities who have challenged state election 
systems contend that "elected black officials supposedly
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7will be more responsive to the needs and demands of the 
black electorate than white elected officials can be" 
(Fainstein and Fainstein 1974; Engstrom and McDonald 1986).
In addition to differentiating between two types of 
representation, Pitkin (1967) also addressed the issue of 
judges as representatives. According to Hogan (1945), 
Bentley (1949), and Pitkin (1967), judges are
representatives. Pitkin (1967) distinguishes between judges 
as representatives of the state and as representatives of 
societal pressures, thus the people. According to this 
scholar, "a judge is an agent of the state like all 
government officials. His pronouncements are not private 
expressions of opinions, but official utterances of the 
state. Hence he represents the state" (Pitkin 1967, 117).
Pitkin (1967) cites the work of Bentley (1949) for a 
discussion of judges as representatives of societal 
pressures. Bentley (1949) views judges as representatives 
because their decisions are influenced by societal pressures 
and popular demands. Bentley states as follows:
so far from being a sort of legal 
machine, they are a functioning part of 
this government, responsive to the group 
pressures within it, representatives of 
all sorts of pressures, and using their 
representative judgment to bring these 
pressures to balance, not indeed in just 
the same way, but on just the same 
basis, that any other agency or 
government does (1949, 393).
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Other factors play major roles in judicial decision-making 
(Nagel 1962; Woodford 1977; Goldman and Sarat 1978; Miller 
1978; Spaeth 1979; Tate 1981). Among these factors are 
group pressures and popular demands or public opinion.
When Chief Justice John Marshall established the 
principle of judicial review in the case of Marburv v. 
Madison (1803), he changed the direction and role of the 
American judiciary as a mere interpreter of law or the 
meaning of the United States Constitution. The United 
States Supreme Court's decisions in Marburv and in later 
cases have led to judicial activism on the part of the 
Supreme Court as well as other federal courts. Judicial 
activism involves the role of judges as policymakers. 
Judicial activism means "the propensity of federal judges, 
mainly but not always on the Supreme Court, to intervene in 
the governing process, so as to substitute their judgment 
for that of federal and state political officers" (Miller 
1982, 6). On the other hand, judicial restraint focuses on 
judges as interpreters of law.
Obviously judges no longer simply say what the law is; 
instead they make and influence public policy as a result of 
their decisions. This statement in addition to the 
arguments of those who contend that judges are actually 
represents of the people (Hogan 1945; Bentley 1949; Pitkin 
1967) may be substantiated by works focusing on the role of
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
9judges in the anti-drug crusades in the United States (Hagan 
1980; Himmelstein 1983; Wisotsky 1986; Myers 1989). The 
most recent work is that of Myers (1989) in which she 
focuses on the sentencing patterns of judges in cases 
involving drug offenders.
According to Myers (1989), the severity of sentences 
imposed on those found guilty of drug trafficking is 
influenced by the context in which the decisions are made, 
the involvement of the legislature in anti-drug crusades as 
a response to constituents wishes, and the race of the 
offenders. This researcher concludes that the harshness of 
sentences is affected by popular demands. This scholar 
analyzes the behaviors of judges serving on Georgia state 
courts from January 1977 through May 1985.
Myers (1989) found that after President Ronald Reagan 
revealed his "war on drugs" crusade, the severity of 
sentences for drug offenders became harsher in Georgia. In 
comparison with pre-1980 sentences, drug users and those 
convicted of sale or distribution were most likely to be 
incarcerated in 1980, the year when comprehensive 
legislation was passed (Myers 1989, 308).
One interesting finding of Myers (1989) was that black 
offenders received harsher sentences at the height of the 
anti-drug crusade. This finding is consistent with Peterson 
and Hagan’s (1984) findings that the differences in 
sentencing on the basis of race were functions of the
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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offense as well as the political and social context when 
sentencing occurred. In other words," public opinion affects 
the sentencing behavior of judges.
The judiciary has assumed a similar posture in other 
controversial matters. For example, in 1914 the United 
States Supreme Court established the exclusionary rule. 
According to this rule, those accused of criminal activities 
were granted specific rights. Among these rights was the 
provision that inadmissible evidence or evidence acquired 
without a search warrant or a coerced confession could not 
be used by prosecutors in criminal trials.
After much public pressure based on the belief that too 
many "criminals" were being freed as a result of legal 
technicalities, the United States Supreme Court established 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the very rule the Court 
devised years earlier. In U.S. v. Pavner (1980) the Court 
ruled that searchers of third parties to obtain evidence 
against another individual is constitutional and does not 
violate the rights of the third party, since the evidence 
relates to another party rather than the person or 
possessions of the person being searched. In U.S. v. Leon 
(1984) the Court devised the "good faith" exception to the 
exclusionary rule. According to the "good faith" exception, 
if police officers make a "good faith" effort to acquire a 
search warrant, the evidence the police find during a search 
may be admissible in a court trial even if the warrant is
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later found to be defective. Another exception the Court 
established is the third party search.
The judiciary may be said to be responding to an 
increase in criminal behavior in American cities as well as 
public intolerance for such deviant behavior. Thus the 
United State Supreme Court is willing to make exceptions to 
its own precedents in an effort to deal with societal 
pressures and problems. Clearly the Court is creating law 
rather than merely reaching decisions based on past rulings 
or precedents.
The above discussion exemplifies the impact changes in 
public opinion may have on the decision-making of judges.
Not only do judges say what the law is, they also make law 
or public policy which affect the lives of citizens.
Whereas judges may not be viewed as representatives in the 
traditional sense as legislators are, it is obvious that 
judges do take into consideration the public will and good 
when reaching decisions. It may be contended that judges 
make decisions based upon their knowledge of what the law is 
and the impact their decisions will have on public policy.
Justice William Brennan (1982) and Pitkin (1967) summed 
up the representative role of judges best in following 
statements, respectively:
Under our system, judges are not mere 
umpires, but, in their sphere, 
lawmakers— a coordinate branch of 
government (See Miller 1982, 1).
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Anyone in charge of another or (make) 
decisions that affect him is his 
representative.... If a trustee can 
represent, and a guardian his ward, then 
parents "really" represent their 
children, and anyone in charge of 
another or making decisions that affect 
him is his representative. Or again, if 
a substitute or deputy represents, then 
a physician represents his patients and 
an engineer his clients, and indeed "any 
specialization of function involves the 
idea of representation" (Pitkin 1967, 
120) .
The findings of Welch et al. (1988) on black judges 
provide evidence which suggest that black judges do make a 
difference. They found that black judges do provide both a 
descriptive and substantive form of representation. The 
authors analyzed the decisions of ten black judges and 130 
white judges from 1968 to 1979. They were interested in the 
sentencing patterns of black and white judges. Their sample 
population consisted of 3,418 male defendants convicted of 
felonies during this time period in a large northeastern 
city, which they refer to as "Metro City." Welch et al. 
found that "black judges are more likely than white judges 
to sentence white defendants to prison and to give less 
severe sentences to black defendants" (1988, 134). On the 
other hand, white judges were more lenient on white 
defendants and harsher in their sentencing of black 
defendants. According to the authors, "black judges tend to 
treat black and white defendants more equally than do white 
judges" (1988, 134). Welch et al. concluded
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thus, black judges provide more than 
symbolic representation. At least 
those in Metro City also provide 
substantive representation for black 
defendants and presumably the black 
community. To the extent they equalize 
the criminal justice system’s treatment 
of black and white defendants, as they 
seem to for the crucial decision to 
incarcerate, they thwart discrimination 
against black defendants. In fact, the 
quality of justice received by both 
black and white defendants may be 
improved (1908, 134).
Similarly, Smith (1983, 18) in his analysis of the 
voting behavior of black judges serving on courts throughout 
the United States found that "about one-third of black 
judges believe that providing symbolic pride, inspiration, 
and status for blacks is an important function of their 
service on the bench." Additionally, almost 40 percent of 
the black judges in his study believed an important function 
of black judges is to behave in a manner to reduce racism in 
the legal system.
Despite the findings of Welch et al. (1988) and Smith 
(1983), those challenging judicial election schemes base 
their arguments on allegations of violation of Section S of 
the Voting Rights Act, the Fourteenth Amendment (Equal 
Protection Clause), and the Fifteenth Amendment (Right to 
Vote). The issue of representation has arisen as a response 
to the plaintiffs’ lawsuits.
A second factor which has resulted in more attention 
being focused on legislative races rather than judicial
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elections is gerrymandering, which is the drawing of 
legislative district lines for the purpose of obtaining 
partisan or factional advantage. Gerrymandering may occur 
as a result of "reapportionment, or the allocation of seats 
in the House of each state after the Census, and 
redistricting, the redrawing of the boundaries of 
legislative districts within each state (Keefe and Ogul 
1964, 68-85).
Challenges to the reapportionment of legislative 
districts resulted in the United States Supreme Court 
invoking the "one-man, one-vote" principle of Article I, 
Section 2 of the United States Constitution. Another issue 
involved in the reapportionment of legislative districts is 
the issue of at-large versus single-member districts. 
Challenges to the issue of reapportionment of legislative 
districts began in the early 1960s with the landmark case of 
Baker v. Carr (1962). Earlier research indicated that at- 
large districts dilute the voting strengths of minority 
voters (Jones 1976; Taebel 1978; Robinson and Dye 1978; 
Latimer 1979; Engstrom and McDonald 1982; Karnig and Welch 
1982).
Welch (1990) contended that at-large election schemes 
no longer result in the underrepresentation of minorities. 
MacManus (1978, 1979) and Bullock and MacManus (1987) 
agreed with Welch’s contention. According to these 
scholars, social scientists who have concluded that at-large
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election systems dilute minority voting strength base their 
arguments on data collected in the middle to late 1970s 
(Svara 1977; Karnig and Welch 1982; Engstrom and McDonald
1982). Welch (1990) stated that these studies have ignored 
the growth in black local representation since the 1970s.
Welch's (1990, 1053) study "is based on a survey of 
every U.S. city which had a 1984 population of at least 50 
thousand and which had a minimum of 5 percent Hispanic or 5 
percent black population in 1980." The author conducted 
mail questionnaires with city clerks employed in these 
cities. The number of clerks responding to the 
questionnaire was 314 (100% of the respondents). The clerks 
provided information on "the number of council members 
elected at-large, the number elected in single-member 
districts or wards, and the number chosen in districts or 
wards electing more than one member" (Welch 1990, 1053).
The author also requested the race or ethnicity and gender 
of council members elected at-large.
Despite her contention that at-large election 
structures no longer lead to an underrepresentation of 
minorities, Welch (1990) concluded that "although at-large 
elections represent blacks much better than a decade ago, 
there is still a small gap between the representation 
afforded by at-large and district systems. On the other 
hand, the impact of local election structures on Hispanic
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representation is less clearcut and seems to vary from 
region to region" (1990, 1050).
Those challenging judicial election systems in 
Louisiana and in at least six other states would disagree 
with Welch's contention that at-large election structures no 
longer result in the underrepresentation of minorities.
They would probably argue that the "gap" Welch referred to 
still dilutes the voting strength of minorities.
The first case in Louisiana involving the issue of 
minority vote dilution in judicial elections occurred in 
1972 with Wells v. Edwards (1973). The issues involved in 
this case were reapportionment as well as representation.
The Louisiana Federal District Court's distinction 
between the role of judges and legislators supported the 
traditional view that judges are not actually 
representatives of the people. In Wells v . Edwards the 
Federal District Court held that the concept of one-person, 
one-vote does not apply to judicial elections because judges 
do not represent the electorate in the same sense as do 
legislators and members of the executive branch. According 
to Federal District Judges Ainsworth, Gordon, and West, 
judges interpret the laws, they do not make them.
Two lawsuits involving challenges to the at-large 
system for electing city and state judges were filed in 
1980. These two cases were Voter Information Project, Inc. 
V. City of Baton Rouoe and Fames v . Edwards. The plaintiffs
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in these cases contended that the at-large electoral system 
violated provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. As a result of the heavy burden of proof 
required by plaintiffs in such cases, both cases were 
dismissed. Plaintiffs were required to prove discriminatory 
intent (Mobile v. Bolden 1980).
In 1982 the burden of proof or the showing of 
discriminatory intent by plaintiffs was lessened when 
Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights of 1965.
The U.S. Supreme Court also set the standard for 
demonstrating vote dilution as a violation of Section 2 in 
its decision in Thornburg v . Singles (1986). In response to
the amending of Section 2 and the Court’s Thornburg
decision, three lawsuits challenging Louisiana’s judicial 
election structure were filed by those acting on behalf of 
black voters.
Chisom V. Edwards (1987) commenced in the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs 
in this case alleged that Louisiana’s at-large judicial 
election scheme violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The
case was dismissed, since the district court agreed with the
defendants’ claim that Congress did not include the election 
of judges when it enacted Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 because judges are not representatives.
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The plaintiffs appealed the case to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Court reversed the 
ruling of the district court and remanded the case. The 
Fifth Circuit interpreted Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
as including judges, who are elected officials.
In 1988 Governor Charles Roemer became a party to the 
lawsuit in his capacity as Louisiana’s chief executive. The 
statutory and constitutional claims advanced in Chisom v. 
Roemer were dismissed by the district court. The plaintiffs 
appealed the district court’s decision once again. The 
Fifth Circuit remanded the case once again to the district 
court. The case was later dismissed. The Fifth Circuit 
dismissed the appeal by relying upon its decision in Latin 
American Citizens Council #4434 v . Clements (1990) in which 
the court held that judges are not representatives and 
therefore were not included within the protections provided 
by Congress in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
as amended in 1982.
To support its contention that judges are not 
"representatives", the Fifth Circuit referred to the case of 
Buchanan v. Rhodes (1960) in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
concluded that "judges do not represent the people, they 
serve the people" (385 U.S. 3).
In 1990 the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of 
certiorari to the plaintiffs in Chisom v. Roemer. The Court 
granted certiorari because the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in
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Chisom conflicted with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Mallory v. Evrich (1988). Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the 
Sixth Circuit ruled that Congress’ inclusion of the word 
"representatives" in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, as amended 1982, was not an intentional attempt to 
exclude the election of judicial candidates. According to 
the Sixth Circuit, challenges to judicial election 
structures were within the scope of the provisions of 
Section 2.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s resolution of the dispute 
between the Fifth and Sixth Circuits in their 
interpretations of the meaning of the word "representatives" 
in Section 2 of the Voting Right Act is pending. An 
interesting factor in the district as well as U.S. Supreme 
Court judges preoccupation with the word "representative" in 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is that legislative 
material which accompanied the amendment of Section 2 in 
1982 contained nine factors which should be considered when 
deciding Section 2 violations. Judges who have ruled on 
cases involving vote dilution in judicial elections, in 
addition to, voting rights violations have chosen to ignore 
these factors. These nine factors are contained in Appendix 
One.
A third reason judicial elections have not been 
researched to the same degree as legislative races has to do 
with the role of political parties or partisanship in state
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legislative races versus the role of parties in state 
judicial contests. Political parties play a greater role in 
legislative contests than they do in state judicial races. 
Whereas persons seeking legislative offices may campaign 
upon the differing political philosophies of their parties, 
judicial candidates must adhere to the American Bar 
Association's Code of Judicial Conduct. This Code places 
limits on judicial candidates who may wish to express their 
opinions on public policy issues. A candidate for judicial 
office is instructed by the Code to "not make pledges or 
promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the duties of the office" and not 
to "announce his views on disputed legal or political 
issues" (Code Canon 7 (B)(1)(C)). As a result of the 
limitations placed upon judicial candidates by the Code, 
"judicial candidates stress their personal qualifications 
for the bench and their views on such subjects as the 
administration of justice and court reform. If judicial 
candidates compete on partisan ballots, they are permitted 
by the Code to acknowledge a connection with a political 
party, but the campaign necessarily must remain formally 
nonprogrammatic. And in states utilizing the nonpartisan 
nomination and election method of selection, state law 
usually prohibits political party organizations from 
offering endorsements to candidates and from engaging in 
direct or indirect campaign activity on behalf of a
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candidate" (Dubois 1980, 66). In short, partisanship does 
not serve the function of a voting cue in state judicial 
elections as opposed to its role in the nomination and 
election of legislators.
A final explanation for a lower level of research on 
judicial elections when compared to legislative ones is the 
saliency of legislative races. Because of the prestige and 
media attention given to members of Congress, congressional 
office may be viewed as a more desirable and popular office 
than a judgeship. Furthermore, the incumbents of judicial 
office are usually uncontested. In fact, judges serve 
longer terms in office than other officeholders. On the 
other hand, legislators are contested for their seats which 
result in political campaigns in an effort to win public 
office. Also "due to the issueless and lackluster 
campaigns, critics argue that public attention to judicial 
election contest is low. And due to this lack of interest, 
it is argued that the public is not interested in informing 
itself about the qualifications of those candidates seeking 
judicial office" (Dubois 1980, 32-33).
Furthermore, voters are more likely to vote in 
legislative races, since they believe the policy initiatives 
of these officeholders affect their daily lives. In 
contrast, most voters never come in contact with members of 
the judiciary. Legislators represent and promote policies 
which are in the best interest of their constituents. As a
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
22
result, constituencies represented by particular legislators 
are more likely to re-elect them based upon the "benefits" 
the legislators are perceived to have provided for their 
respective districts or states (Davidson 1969; Fiorina 
1974). When people vote for legislators or choose to 
participate in such elections, they do so because they 
believe these candidates will act in their best interest.
Events of the late 1980s have resulted in judicial 
election systems receiving a considerable amount of 
attention. As a result of these events, it is my opinion 
that more research effort must be devoted to analyzing 
judicial elections. The events I am referring to are the 
growing number of court cases challenging such elections 
(Clark V. Edwards 1988; Chisom v. Edwards 1987; Chisom v. 
Roemer 1990; Arnold v. Roemer 1988; LULAC v. Clements 1990; 
Rangel v. Mattox 1988; Brooks v. Glvnn Countv, Georgia Board 
of Election 1988; Williams v. State Board of Elections 1988; 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Alabama v.
Siege 1man 1989; Mallorv v . Evrich 1988; Martin v . Mabus 
1988; Al-Hakim et al. v. State of Florida 1988). These 
lawsuits are similar to lawsuits which have been filed 
challenging legislative districts. They have been brought 
alleging that minorities do not have an equal opportunity to 
participate in elections and elect candidates of choice as a 
result of discriminatory state judicial election systems.
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Minorities in Louisiana have based their arguments on 
the fact that as recent as 1989, of the 239 judges serving 
on courts of general jurisdiction, there were only nine 
black state court judges. Additionally, only one black 
judge sat on the Louisiana Court of Appeals and none on the 
state Supreme Court. The small number of black judges in 
Louisiana and other states and the lawsuits involving 
allegations of violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments have increased the attention of scholars, laymen, 
and federal judges to the impact of electoral participation 
in state judicial elections.
Importance of Analyzing Voter Turnout in State 
Judicial Elections
Researchers who have focused their attentions on 
judicial elections as a result of recent challenges to such 
races have limited their analyses largely to vote choice 
(Weber 1988; Engstrom 1988), minority vote dilution 
(Engstrom 1988, 1989; Weber 1989), statutory and 
constitutional claims (Haydel 1989), or whether judges are 
representatives (Ely 1980; Pruet and Glick 1986; Haydel 
1989; Hickok 1990). What these scholars have not considered 
is: what factors account for variations in voter turnout in
state trial and intermediate appellate court elections? 
Likewise, the question which remains unanswered is: Is the
electorate that participates in state judicial elections
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different from the electorate that participates in other 
elections— presidential and congressional? Furthermore, one 
noteworthy work (Dubois 1980) focused on state supreme court 
elections as opposed to district court elections.
The main line of argument advanced in this analysis is 
even if district lines are redrawn to change the composition 
of judicial districts into ones with an overwhelming number 
of a certain race, particularly blacks or whites, will such 
a change make state judicial election results more 
democratic? The likelihood of this occurring is very 
unlikely, particularly if the people do not choose to 
participate in such elections. In other words, if the 
racial factor which results in racial polarization in voting 
is remedied by changing the composition of districts, will 
minorities choose to vote in such elections in reformed 
systems?
In my opinion, an examination of voter turnout in state 
judicial elections should be treated with equal importance 
as constitutional and racial polarization or minority vote 
dilution issues. A focus upon the legal and constitutional 
questions involved in challenges to state judicial elections 
without emphasizing the fact that minorities are challenging 
the drawing of district lines which have the effect of 
diluting their voting strength, not the fact that the size 
of the white population exceeds the black or minority 
population. Emphasizing the former may eventually result in
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a backlash for minorities, particularly in states such as 
Louisiana with major cities consisting of large minority 
populations. I argue that just as affirmative action 
policies and programs have led to reverse discrimination 
cases (Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
1978; United Steelworkers v. Weber 1979; Firefighters Local 
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts 1984; Wvoant v. Jackson Board of 
Education 1986), challenges to state judicial election 
structures and particularly the fact that researchers have 
not conducted studies on the major issue— gerrymandered and 
at-large as opposed to single-member districts— will 
eventually lead to whites challenging the composition of 
election structures which allegedly dilute their voting 
strength. For example, in 1987 white citizens in 
Birmingham, Alabama filed a lawsuit challenging the election 
process of selecting council members. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the votes of white citizens were being diluted 
as the result of the present majority black population in 
Birmingham.
To support my contention, I turn attention to mayoral 
races in United States’ cities. The successes of black 
mayoral candidates in the United States’ cities have been 
attributed to the large minority populations in such cities. 
The victories of Coleman Young in Detroit, Ernest Morial and 
Sidney Bartholemy in New Orleans, Harold Washington in 
Chicago, and Maynard Jackson and Andrew Young in Atlanta
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occurred because of the support they received from the 
majority black populations within their respective cities.
Rich (1987) discussed the shifts in population in 
Detroit during the Young administration. The author 
presented an analysis of Detroit’s changing population which 
may be generalized to explain transitions in the populations 
of other American cities, thus accounting for the victories 
enjoyed by mayoral candidates in these cities. According to 
Rich (1987, 201), "the flow of escaping white residents, 
which began in the 1960s with the rise of racial tensions, 
approached a floodtide in the 1970s when both middle and 
working class whites began to move out. Detroit’s white 
population in 1970 was 838,877. By 1980 it had diminished 
to 444,730. Between 1970 and 1988 Detroit’s black 
population had actually increased from 672,602 to 758,939." 
In other words, what has been referred to as "white flight" 
from the cities account for the transition in the 
populations of some American cities. This has resulted in 
electoral successes for black candidates, specifically 
mayoral candidates.
Unless judicial scholars provide research on the impact 
previously drawn district lines may have on the successful 
election of minority candidates to the bench, it is my 
belief that many frivolous lawsuits will eventually be filed 
by white voters residing in U.S. cities with majority black 
populations contending vote dilution on the basis of the
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size of the black population. I refer to such lawsuits as 
frivolous, since most would correctly argue that a minority, 
specifically an African-American, will never become 
President of the United States for the simple reason that 
such a candidate would have a difficult time encouraging 
crossover voting. Despite this fact, blacks have not filed 
lawsuits challenging the election of the President on the 
basis that the white population in the United States is 
larger than the black population. Additionally, whites have 
not challenged electoral structures on the basis of white 
vote dilution as a result of district lines which have been 
redrawn by minority officeholders. Instead whites have 
challenged electoral structures which have been in place for 
years only after blacks gain a majority within a particular 
area. Once again, scholars’ emphases on constitutional, 
statutory, and representational claims without focusing on 
the impact gerrymandered and at-large districts may have on 
the successes of minority candidates does not provide laymen 
nor federal judges with a holistic nor accurate view of what 
is actually occurring in terms of challenges to judicial 
election systems.
The present study’s emphasis on voter turnout in state 
judicial elections is only one step in the direction of 
providing much needed information on the judicial election 
process. Just as researchers have examined and provided 
explanations for variations in voter turnout in
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presidential, congressional, and other elections 
(Ashenfelter and Kelley 1975; Nie et al. 1976; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980; Shaffer 1981; Caldeira and Patterson 1982; 
Beyle 1983; Copeland 1983; Kenney 1983), this research 
represents an attempt to provide an understanding of the 
behavior of the electorate, the type of election environment 
which stimulates voter participation, as well as which 
candidate attributes are more likely to motivate people to 
vote in judicial elections.
Summary
As a result of legal challenges to state judicial 
election structures, scholars can no longer limit their 
research agendas mainly to providing analyses of voter 
behavior in highly contested races such as presidential, 
congressional, and gubernatorial elections. The willingness 
of plaintiffs to bring lawsuits challenging judicial 
election structures demonstrates that the electorate is 
cognitive of the impact the judiciary or judges, 
specifically state judges, have on public policies in 
American society.
Political scientists attempt to interpret or explain 
what occurs in the political arena on an international, 
national, state, and local government basis. Therefore, 
judicial scholars should include in their research efforts 
examinations of electoral participation in judicial 
elections. Furthermore, the recent lawsuits challenging
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judicial election processes indicate that a body of 
literature explaining the processes involved in such 
elections is necessary. A reliance upon legislative and 
presidential literature cannot adequately explain what 
occurs in state judicial elections.
A final observation involving the need for more 
research on state judicial elections is the emphasis on 
constitutional claims. A preoccupation with the legalities 
involved in such elections divert attention away from 
electoral behavior in judicial elections. Just as voter 
behavior has been analyzed in presidential and congressional 
races, electoral behavior in state judicial elections should 
be given similar scholarly attention. Additionally, a focus 
on the constitutional and statutory claims involved in 
challenges to state judicial elections without devoting 
equal attention to the issue of at-large versus single­
member districts may result in white voters challenging 
election structures they believe dilute their voting 
strength. To prevent the backlash which may result from 
whatever changes are put in place to remedy minority vote 
dilution in judicial races, scholars should educate voters 
and judicial candidates on the factors which serve as 
catalysts to encourage electoral participation as well as 
crossover voting in state judicial contests. An examination 
of factors which stimulate voter turnout in these elections 
should provide an understanding of and information on which
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factors increase voter turnout as well as the electability 
of judicial candidates. Such research may reveal that black 
judicial candidates might increase their chances of winning 
contests against white candidates if they (black candidates) 
possess certain traits. For example, black candidates who 
are able to raise and attract campaign expenditures may have 
greater chances of drawing voters to the polls than black 
candidates who do not have access to the funding necessary 
to inform voters of their candidacy or the judicial 
election. Supporting judicial candidates who are most 
likely to encourage crossover voting and attract campaign 
expenditures is as important as changing the composition of 
judicial districts. In short, aiding in the understanding 
of the game of politicking is equally important to the 
success of judicial candidates as examining lawsuits 
challenging such elections.
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Chapter Two 
Voter Turnout in State Judicial Elections
Understanding the dynamics of voter turnout in state 
judicial elections is important in order to make the 
election of state judges a more democratic process.
Providing analyses of the factors which might encourage 
electoral participation in such elections are crucial, 
particularly in light of recent challenges to judicial 
elections structures. Furthermore, because of the lack of 
scholarly attention devoted to examining judicial elections, 
in most cases the only reference point available for 
determining the impact of various factors on voter turnout 
in state judicial elections is research which has focused on 
non-judicial elections.
The works of scholars who have focused their attentions 
on judicial elections may be divided into two main 
categories. The first category includes those scholars who 
have examined the impact contextual variables or the 
judicial election context may have on voter turnout in state 
judicial elections. The contextual factors these scholars 
have considered in their research efforts are the scheduling 
of judicial elections (Hannah 1972; Adamany and Dubois 1976; 
Dubois 1980), the competitiveness of these elections (Hannah 
1972; Dubois 1980), type of election systems (Dubois 1980), 
and ballot format (Dubois 1980).
31
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The second category consists of the characteristics of 
judicial candidates. These scholars are interested in the 
influence candidate attributes may have on stimulating 
electoral participation in state judicial elections. This 
category includes the works of Dubois (1984) on the gender 
of judicial candidates; Collins (1980), Atkins et al.
(1984), and Alozie (1988) on the race of these candidates; 
Dubois (1986) on the campaign expenditure of judicial 
candidates; and Dubois (1980) on incumbency or prior 
judicial experience.
Both of these categories will be discussed in depth in 
the following sections.
Impact of Contextual Variables 
Election Scheduling
Scholars analyzing the effects of election scheduling 
on electoral participation in state judicial elections have 
found evidence which suggest similar findings as researchers 
who have contended that general elections occurring during 
presidential election years are characterized by an increase 
in voter turnout. For example, Angus Campbell (1966) 
distinguished between "core" and "peripheral" voters. 
Campbell coined these terms to explain short-term variations 
in voter turnout. According to Campbell (1966, 42-43),
"core" voters are those whose level of 
political interest is sufficiently high 
to take them to the polls in all 
national elections, even those held in
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mid-term where the amount of stimulation 
is low. The "core" voters are joined in 
the presidential years by the 
"peripheral" voters whose level of 
political interest is lower but whose 
motivation to vote has been sufficiently 
increased by the stimulation of the 
election to carry them to the polls.
Campbell’s distinction between "core" and "peripheral" 
voters indicates that the scheduling of elections does have 
an impact on electoral participation. This is evident by 
the fact that high saliency races such as presidential 
general elections encourage electoral participation.
One pioneering research effort involving state judicial 
elections is that of Hannah (1972) who examined the levels 
of voter participation, electoral competition, and the 
political and socioeconomic basis of voting patterns in 
Michigan’s nonpartisan elections for supreme court and 
circuit court judges from 1948 to 1968. Hannah measured 
turnout as a percentage of the votes cast in the top 
partisan race. She found evidence which suggest that the 
scheduling of judicial elections affects participation or 
turnout in such elections. Dubois (1980, 41-42) summed up 
Hannah’s results by stating that "judicial elections held 
concurrently with the quadrennial presidential election had 
the highest turnout, followed by those held concurrently 
with the biennial gubernatorial elections in the mid-term 
years, with the lowest turnout observed in the spring 
elections." Her results also indicated that judicial
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election turnout in any given election year was considerably 
lower than turnout for more salient races at the top of the 
ballot (e.g., president, governor, or U.S. congressperson>. 
In other words, Hannah found that rolloff occurred when 
judicial elections were scheduled concurrently with more 
salient races such as presidential, gubernatorial, or state 
legislators. Rolloff occurs when voters participate in 
"major partisan offices" at the top of the ballot but fail 
to cast ballots in the judicial elections (Dubois 1979,
871 ) .
Adamany and Dubois (1976) analyzed Wisconsin supreme 
court elections and confirmed Hannah’s findings on Michigan 
supreme court elections that election scheduling has an 
impact on electoral turnout in judicial elections. Dubois 
(1980) also confirmed the earlier findings of Campbell 
(1966) by conducting a state-by-state inspection of the 
effects of election scheduling on voter participation or 
turnout in state supreme court elections. The author found 
that voter turnout was greatest in presidential years, with 
the exception of one state (Nevada). Voter turnout was also 
found to be higher during mid-term election years than in 
judicial elections scheduled in off-years. Dubois (1980,
45) concluded as follows;
Election scheduling, therefore, explains 
a great deal about judicial election 
turnout. Indeed, it is logical to 
assume that the overall level of 
participation in a state’s judicial
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elections is largely a reflection of 
turnout for the major statewide and 
national contests which pull voters to 
the polls in the first place. It is 
also true, however, that those states 
with high levels of participation in the 
major races of president, governor, and 
United States Senator are not 
necessarily the same as those with high 
judicial election turnout.
Boyd (1986) analyzed the effects of election calendars 
as well as ballot forms on voter turnout in primaries and 
statewide races held concurrently with 1976, 1980, and 1984 
presidential elections. According to Boyd, voter turnout is 
effected by the type of races placed on the ballot which 
increase the attractiveness of the ballot for voters. For 
example, he found that the occurrence of a gubernatorial 
race during the presidential year increases ballot 
attractiveness thus increasing the likelihood that an 
individual would vote. Similarly, Hannah (1972) and Dubois 
(1980) found that judicial elections placed on the ballot 
during presidential elections were associated with increased 
turnout. However, these authors attributed an increase in 
electoral participation to the popularity of the 
presidential race whereas Boyd associated increased voter 
turnout to the popularity of gubernatorial or statewide 
races. Despite this discrepancy, these authors concluded 
that the presence of a salient race on the ballot will 
increase overall voter turnout even in less visible races.
According to Boyd (1989, 730), presidential and state
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primaries divert resources away from the general election 
and reduce turnout among the peripheral electorate who are 
most dependent on a mobilization effort. Whereas, Boyd did 
not view the frequency of elections as causing voter 
fatigue, thus decreasing voter turnout, it may be argued 
that both voter fatigue (Walker 1966; Dubois 1980) and the 
dissipation of resources as a result of frequent elections 
account for variations in voter turnout. In other words, as 
a result of the number of elections scheduled during a given 
year, voters are more likely to participate in elections 
they perceive to be the most important. This observation 
may be a plausible explanation for a decline in electoral 
participation in less salient judicial elections held during 
off-years or on schedules different than the regular primary 
and general elections.
Election Svstems
Researchers who have studied the impact of election 
system types on voter turnout in state judicial elections 
have focused on differences in electoral participation under 
partisan, nonpartisan, merit retention, and mixed ballots. 
The impact of election systems is most evident when voter 
turnout in judicial elections is measured as a percentage of 
the vote cast for the "major partisan office" at the top of 
the ballot in an election year instead of being calculated 
as a percentage of the total voting age population. Major 
partisan office include the presidential, gubernatorial, or
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United States senatorial races which are the most salient 
races. Measuring voter turnout in this manner controls for 
the effects of those races at the top of the ballot on voter 
turnout.
Dubois (1980, 47) found when analyzing Wisconsin 
supreme court elections that "the data more clearly suggest 
that judicial election turnout is not solely the result of 
election scheduling and turnout at the top of the ballot.
It appears that a greater percentage of voters complete 
their judicial ballots in states utilizing partisan ballots 
than in those utilizing the nonpartisan or merit retention 
ballot forms." The partisan election system consists of a 
ballot which contains information about the party 
affiliation of candidates. As a result of the low saliency 
of judicial elections as well as judicial candidates, "the 
candidates’ partisan affiliation is the single most 
important voting cue in state judicial elections. Moreover, 
it is clear that if the office being contested is less 
important to the voter and the candidates competing for such 
low-salience offices are less familiar and the issues less 
visible, the voter will rely less upon short-term 
considerations of particular candidates and issues and more 
upon long-term psychological attachment to a political 
party" (Cowart 1973, 835).
A voting cue is removed when the nonpartisan election 
system is utilized. As a result, the nonpartisan ballot
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tends to discourage voter participation. In states 
employing the nonpartisan ballot, the political parties play 
no formal role in the nomination and recruitment of judicial 
candidates. Whereas some voters may complete their ballots 
because they recognize a familiar name or the name of an 
incumbent, other voters may not participate in the judicial 
elections because they do not perceive any recognizable 
differences among the judicial candidates.
Like the nonpartisan election system, the merit 
retention ballot lacks the party label. In addition to 
lacking the cue of political party absent from the 
nonpartisan ballot, voters in the merit retention states 
also lack a choice between competing candidates (Dubois 
1980, 48). The reason for this is that the candidates of 
the merit retention ballot are uncontested. The merit 
retention ballot requires voters to cast either a "yes" or 
"no" vote. Consequently, "once in the polling booth, many 
voters may fail to mark the retention ballot believing that 
their votes will have little impact upon the final result" 
(Dubois 1980, 49).
An election system which has not attracted much 
scholarly attention is the mixed partisan nomination—  
nonpartisan election system. In this type of election 
system, judicial candidates are nominated by the political 
parties, however, the party label is excluded from the 
ballot. According to Dubois (1980, 72), "with the low
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visibility and attention attached to supreme court contests 
generally, it is not likely that the party cue in these 
states which use the system of partisan nomination but 
nonpartisan election, hereinafter called "mixed" states, is 
as strong as it is in those partisan states where party is 
clearly labeled on the general election ballot." Despite 
this observation, unlike the nonpartisan nomination and 
election system, the mixed system is more likely to result 
in voters completing the judicial ballot or a decrease in 
rolloff, since some voters are able to make a connection 
between judicial candidates and their partisan affiliations 
as a result of the partisan nomination process.
Dubois (1980, 244) distinguished between the impact of 
election systems on voter participation by concluding as
follows:
First, partisan judicial elections are 
more frequently contested than non­
partisan elections or, of course, the 
uncontested merit retention ballot- 
ings.... The second distinction between 
partisan and nonpartisan merit retention 
ballots which accounts for variations in 
the level of voter participation is the 
presence of a meaningful voter cue on 
the former and its absence on the 
latter.
In other words, the partisan ballot provides the voter with 
a voting cue, political party affiliation. It is this 
voting cue which aids voters in their attempts to 
differentiate between opposing judicial candidates whom they
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know nothing or very little about. For this reason, the 
partisan ballot increases voter participation in judicial 
races, whereas the nonpartisan ballot depresses voter 
participation.
Ballot Format
Three types of ballot formats have been examined to
explain variations in voter turnout in state judicial
elections. Walker (1966) discussed these three formats when
determining the relationship between ballot forms and voter
fatigue. According to the author, the three ballot formats
are: (1) party column or Indiana, (2) office block or
Massachusetts, and (3) Pennsylvania ballots.
Dubois (1980) provided a description of each format.
According to Dubois (1980, 53-54),
the party column ballot lists the
candidates of each party for all offices 
in a single column or row. The 
alternative ballot form, the office 
block ballot, groups candidates of both 
major parties by the office which is 
being contested. A third basic ballot 
format called the Pennsylvania ballot, 
is in actuality a hybrid of the two 
major ballot forms. Voters using a 
Pennsylvania-type ballot face the 
typical office block format, but at the 
same time a party circle or lever is 
available for those voters who choose to 
cast a straight party ballot.
In short, this ballot allows for split-ticket voting as well 
as voting a straight party ticket.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
4 1
Voter turnout is expected to be greatest in states 
utilizing the party column ballot and the least in states 
utilizing the office block ballot. Thus, the partisan 
judicial ballot encourages voters to participate in the 
selection of their supreme court justices (judges), 
particularly when the ballot is equipped with a device which 
allows the voters to make all of their electoral choices in 
a single motion (Dubois 1980, 58).
Another issue involved in determining the impact of
ballot format on voter turnout is rolloff. Rolloff occurs
when voters vote for offices at the top of the ballot, but
do not vote for lower offices. According to Walker (1966,
451), "the amount of rolloff is greater in state utilizing
the office block ballot than in states utilizing the party
column ballot format." This finding may be attributed to
voter fatigue, voters using political parties as voting
cues, the saliency of offices at the top of the ballot when
compared to judicial races, and the convenience of pulling
one lever when the party column ballot is used. Similarly,
Dubois (1980, 53) contended that:
the office block ballot might contribute 
to voter fatigue because it requires the 
voter to express a number of individual 
choices along a lengthy ballot. For 
races well down on the ballot and for 
public measures being decided about 
which the average voters have not 
informed themselves, the voter may 
become frustrated and simply fail to 
complete the ballot.
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Compet11 iveness
Campbell et al. (1960) contended that the perceived 
closeness of an election heightens voter interest thus 
stimulating voter turnout. The impact of competitiveness of 
judicial elections on voter turnout may be based on the 
theoretical premises of the rational-actor model of Downs 
(1957) and Riker and Oidershook’s (1968) calculus of voting. 
The theory here is that voters are more likely to vote in 
what they perceive to be a close or competitive election 
because they believe their votes are likely to affect the 
outcome of the election.
Scholars have found aggregate level support for the 
"competitive threat theory" (Key 1949; Gray 1976). 
Researchers have also shown that intei— party competition is 
associated with higher rates of voting (Dye 1966; Jones 
1964). Howeverj recent studies have questioned the accuracy
of the proposition that inter— party competition affects
voter turnout. In fact, it has been argued that "the 
contribution of the degree of interparty competition to 
turnout may be relatively minor, if not wholly illusory, 
when the effects of socioeconomic, legal, political, and 
regional variables upon participation are first considered"
(Blank 1974, 732). Even Gray (1976) questioned the validity
of the "competitive threat theory" over time.
Cox (1988) went one step further in his argument by 
contending that the technique which has been utilized to
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measure the closeness of election— the percent of the vote 
received by the winner minus the percent of the vote 
received by the runnei— up— results in a spurious correlation 
with turnout. The author presented an alternative measure 
of closeness or the competitiveness of electoral contests.
He contended that the raw vote margin is a better measure of 
closeness than the percentage margin. He did find one 
difficulty with using the raw vote margin. One drawback in 
employing the raw vote margin is that "when it becomes very 
large, it must necessarily have a positive relationship with 
turnout, as explained earlier; thus, one must include its 
square which eats up a degree of freedom" (Cox 1988, 774).
Hannah (1972) and Dubois (1980) considered the impact 
of competitiveness on voter turnout in state judicial 
elections. Hannah did not find any significant differences 
in turnout in Michigan's supreme court races when 
considering the impact of the competitiveness of these 
elections. Similarly, Dubois found that competitive 
judicial races did not increase voter turnout in Wisconsin 
supreme court races. Instead Dubois found that 
competitiveness had its greatest influence on presidential 
primaries which encouraged voters to participate. In other 
words, the competitiveness of the race at the top of the 
ballot had a greater impact on electoral participation than 
did competitive judicial races. It was found that salient 
races which attract public attention may pull voters to the
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polls who then incidentally vote for judicial candidates 
(Dubois 1980, 42).
Impact of Candidate Variables 
Gender of Candidate
Only one scholar has attempted to explain variations in 
electoral participation in state judicial elections in terms 
of the gender of the candidates. Dubois (1984) included sex 
as a voting cue in judicial elections. The author found 
that electoral participation did not deviate from its usual 
level in state judicial elections when female candidates 
were on the ballot. Unlike the race of the candidates, 
campaign expenditures, election systems, elections 
scheduling, and other factors previous research revealed as 
having impacts on voter turnout in judicial elections, the 
gender of judicial candidates was not found to stimulate or 
encourage electoral participation.
Race of Candidate
Judicial election research is almost void of any type 
of research which focuses upon the relationship between the 
race of judicial candidates and electoral participation. 
Collins (1980, 334) found that "the appearance of a black 
candidate in nonpartisan at-large races does net act to 
stimulate comparatively higher levels of turnout among the 
black precincts." The only exception Collins found was in 
the lower category of social class. According to Collins
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(1980, 334), "race appears to be a salient factor only in 
accounting for turnout differences in the lower category of 
social class." In other words, voter turnout among lower 
income black voters tends to increase when a black candidate 
sought judicial office.
This finding may be explained by citing the work of 
Shingles (1981). Shingles found evidence which suggest that 
blacks of lower socioeconomic status vote at a higher rate 
than similarly situated whites. He attributes this 
difference in turnout between blacks and whites to a sense 
of black consciousness. According to Shingles (1981, 76), 
"the primary reason black consciousness has such a dramatic 
effect on political participation is that it contributes to 
the combination of a sense of political efficacy and 
political mistrust which in turn induces political 
involvement." The line of argument presented by Shingles is 
that lower income blacks vote because they do not trust 
government and feel it is their duty to help change 
government. In other words, the act of voting provides 
lower income blacks with a feeling of political efficacy and 
expressive benefits.
A shortcoming of researchers who have focused on the 
impact of the race of judicial candidates on voter turnout 
in state judicial elections is that their primary focus has 
been black voter turnout (Collins 1980; Atkins et al. 1984; 
Alozie 1988). Instead of analyzing whether the presence of
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a black judicial candidate on the ballot increases electoral 
participation in the total population» these scholars have 
focused their attentions only on black voter turnout, thus 
ignoring the larger question: does the race of judicial
candidates have an impact on electoral participation in 
state judicial elections? In other words, is voter turnout 
greater in contests involving black and white candidates as 
opposed to electoral contests in which the candidates are of 
the same race or do white and black voters vote at higher 
rates when white judicial candidates compete against black 
candidates?
Atkins et al. (1984) went one step further than Collins
(1980) when comparing differences in turnout based on the 
race of candidates by matching constituents according to 
their age, education, and nonprofessional occupational 
status. However, like Collins, the authors analyzed whether 
black candidates were influential in drawing black voters to 
the polls in state judicial elections. The data suggested 
that "voters in predominantly black precincts participated 
in substantially higher proportions in the race with a black 
candidate than they did in other races for the Supreme 
Court" (Atkins et al. 1984, 211). They found that a 
candidate’s racial identity did in fact affect voter turnout 
in judicial elections. The authors concluded that the 
presence of black candidates, when socioeconomic variables 
are controlled for, does increase black voter turnout.
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Campaign Spending
Scholars who have analyzed the role of campaign 
spending in American elections have found that the cost of 
financing campaigns is directly related to constituency size 
(Heard I960; Adamany 1972; Owens 1973). The cost of 
informing voters is expected to increase as the size of the 
constituency increases. The cost of mailing campaign 
literature rises in direct proportion to the number of 
voters who have to be reached (Dubois 1986, 273).
Additionally, campaign finance literature suggests that 
the presence of an incumbent in a race will increase 
campaign expenditures (Heard 1960; Adamany 1972; Owens 1973; 
Jacobson 1980). The reason for this finding is that 
incumbents attract contributions and challengers must raise 
and spend large sums of money in an attempt to overcome the 
incumbent’s advantage of name familiarity and prior 
experience.
A final factor which has been considered by scholars is 
the degree of electoral competition on election costs 
(Adamany 1972; Owens 1973). Competitive races have been 
found to cost more than noncompetitive races. The 
candidates involved in competitive races are more likely to 
raise and spend large sums of money in an attempt to 
increase their electabi1ity.
To test the hypothesis that competitive elections 
stimulate campaign expenditures, Cox and Hunger (1989)
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examined the 1982 United States House elections. The
authors based their hypothesis on the works of Caldeira and
Patterson (1982) and Patterson and Caldeira (1983) in which
these scholars found evidence which revealed a positive
correlation between total campaign spending and voter
turnout. Cox and Munger provided three reasons to explain
how competitive races might result in greater expenditures.
The authors stated as follows;
First, instrumentally motivated 
contributors might give more in close 
elections (because their contributions 
have a greater chance of affecting the 
outcome), thereby allowing candidates to 
spend more. Second, even if no 
contributors are instrumental and all 
seek "access" or a specific favor (See 
Denzau and Munger 1986; Ferejohn and 
Noll 1985), one might still expect an 
increase in contributions in closer 
races.... Third, because candidates 
value a given amount of money more 
highly in closer races, they will be 
more willing to borrow, to use their own 
financial resources, and to incur debts 
that they may not be able to pay. All 
of these financial practices allow 
greater campaign cost in closer contests 
(Cox and Munger 1989, 219).
Cox and Munger's explanations support the proposition that 
competitive races might stimulate campaign expenditures. 
Candidates are more likely to seek financial support when 
their chances of winning public office is greatest. 
Candidates perceive their electabi1ity as being greatest in 
close contests.
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The authors also examined whether expenditures affect 
voter turnout. They found that races* involving high 
expenditures were more likely to draw voters to the polls 
than the closeness of the elections. According to Cox and 
Munger (1989, 226), "closeness exerts its predominant effect 
only on participation inside the booth (i.e., rolloff)."
Dubois (1986) argued that there are three aspects of
the role of money in financing judicial elections. The
first factor is the belief that the cost of financing
judicial campaigns may place limitations on competition.
According to Dubois (1986, 265),
such reports naturally limit electoral 
competition by discouraging prospective 
candidates even if campaign finance 
levels have not in fact escalated 
sharply. Another aspect of the role of 
money that has drawn recent attention 
has been the reported heavy reliance 
upon lawyers for the contributions 
required to finance judicial campaigns.
This particular aspect is believed to result in a conflict 
of interest for judges. The final aspect is that the amount 
of campaign spending may influence the electoral success of 
judicial candidates.
Incumbencv or Prior Judicial Experience
A considerable amount of research has been conducted on 
incumbency advantage in congressional elections (Erikson 
1971; Mayhew 1974; Abramowitz 1975; Cover 1977; Parker 1980; 
Collie 1981; Jacobson 1981; Hibbing and Alford 1981; Garand
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and Gross 1984) and other elections (Caldeira and Patterson 
1982; Patterson and Caldeira 1983; Beyle 1983; Jewell and 
Breaux 1988). For example, Mayhew (1974) argued that 
incumbents have an information advantage. According to the 
author, changes in the number of competitive seats in 
congressional districts may be the result of an increase in 
the electoral advantage of incumbents. Mayhew (1974, 317) 
concluded that "incumbency does seem to have increased in 
electoral value, and it is reasonable to suppose that one 
effect of this increase has been to boost House members of 
both parties out of the marginal electoral range." Mayhew 
also emphasized the growth in the availability of resources 
for incumbents. Other examples of explanations advanced to 
explain the increased electoral advantage of incumbents are 
the works of Erikson (1971), Cover (1977), and Hibbing and 
Alford (1981) in which these scholars emphasized changes in 
the electorate. Finally, Abramowitz (1975) and Jacobson
(1981) focused on the importance of weak opponents in 
congressional elections.
Recent studies focusing on incumbency in congressional 
elections have resulted in conflicting findings (Jacobson 
1987; Bauer and Hibbing 1989). Jacobson (1987) concluded 
that competition in congressional races involving incumbent 
House members has not declined. Instead he found that 
incumbent House members must still face competition and that
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their margins of victory as well as their success in their 
bids for reelection have declined over time.
On the other hand, Bauer and Hibbing <1989, 262) 
concluded that: "(1) there has been no meaningful increase
in the chances of big winners subsequently losing and (2) in 
recent elections the chances of scandal-free, unredis­
tricted, previously safe incumbent losing are practically 
null." These authors contended that a decline in the margin 
of victory of incumbent House members is a function of 
whether they were involved in any type of scandal which may 
have an impact on public opinion and their success in being 
reelected. Another factor considered by these authors was a 
change in the composition of the electorate within 
previously safe districts as a result of the redrawing of 
district lines.
Dubois (1980) discussed merit retention elections and 
incumbency. According to the author, few judges have ever 
lost during such elections. Merit retention elections 
require voters to vote "yes" in order for previously 
appointed judicial candidates to remain on the bench and 
"no" if they want to remove an appointed candidate from the 
bench. The merit system of selecting judges consist of an 
appointment process followed by a performance review of the 
judge by the electorate during merit retention elections. 
Dubois <1980, 19) concluded that "voters find it difficult
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to vote against someone without a reasonable alternative 
candidate to vote for."
Despite Dubois’ observations, the relationship between 
incumbency and electoral participation in contested 
nonpartisan state judicial elections has not been explained. 
As a result, judicial research is void of an examination of 
the impact of incumbency on voter turnout in such elections. 
The question which remains unanswered is: does the presence
of an incumbent in contested nonpartisan state judicial 
elections stimulate or depress electoral participation?
Impact of Sociodemographic Variables
Sociodemographic variables have never been considered 
as factors which may affect electoral participation in 
contested nonpartisan state judicial elections. Such 
variables as the age, educational attainment, income level, 
occupation, the race of the electorate, and voting age 
population residing in rural areas are included in this 
analysis in an attempt to determine to what extent electoral 
participation in state judicial elections is influenced by 
the same type of factors that account for participation in 
other elections (e.g., presidential, congressional, 
gubernatorial). In other words, an examination of these 
variables will allow a determination of whether judicial 
election participation is a function of the same or 
different variables that affect voter turnout in other 
races.
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The inclusion of specific sociodemographic variables is 
based on the work of Wolfinger and Rosenstone <1980). A 
very strong relationship was found between rates of voting 
and years of education. Individuals with higher levels of 
education were found to vote more often than those with less 
education. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 42) found that 
"only thirty-eight percent of the respondents with fewer 
than five years of schooling went to the polls, as compared 
with sixty-nine percent of those with a high school diploma, 
and eighty-six percent of those who were college graduates 
and ninety-one percent of the people with at least a year in 
graduate school."
The authors provided two reasons to explain the effects 
of education on voter turnout. The first explanation had to 
do with social norms and a sense of civic duty. They 
contended that better educated individuals were more likely 
to possess these qualities. Secondly, educated persons were 
better able to inform themselves about politics and to 
understand the issues involved in political campaigns. The 
authors concluded that education was the most important 
socioeconomic variable in explaining voter turnout.
The researchers also found a strong relationship 
between income and turnout when controlling for the effects 
of education. They found evidence which suggest that 
turnout increased with income. Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
(1980) provided at least four explanations to explain the
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5 4
relationship between income and voter turnout. First, poor 
people are believed to vote at a considerably lower rate 
than "well-to-do" people because the poor are preoccupied 
with fulfilling their biological needs. According to 
Maslow’s (1981) hierarchy of needs, biological or 
physiological needs (e.g., food, water, sleep, shelter) are 
the most important and basic of all needs. He contended 
that individuals are driven by a desire to fulfill their 
biological or physiological needs. Individuals who are 
preoccupied with meeting these daily needs have neither the 
energy nor the desire to participate in political activities 
(including voting) (Maslow 1981, 26).
Second, higher incomes allow individuals to live in 
better neighborhoods and to be exposed to various norms, 
pressures, and socializations which may encourage political 
participation— voting. Third, people with higher incomes 
are more confident and possess a keener sense of civic duty, 
thus are more likely to vote than poor people. Finally, 
rich people have more to lose as a result of governmental 
policies, therefore they are more likely to participate in 
the political process in an attempt to promote and protect 
their interests (Frey 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found that increased 
job status increased the probability of voting. Their 
results indicated that white-collar workers (professional 
and technical; farmers, managers, administrators; and clerks
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and salespeople) voted at higher rates <86 percent, 76 
percent and 75 percent respectively) than blue-collar 
workers (skilled workers, 64 percent; nondomestic service 
workers, 63 percent; unskilled and semiskilled workers, 53 
percent; and farm laborers and foremen, 46 percent). The 
authors explained their findings by suggesting that some 
jobs bring people into contact with issues involving 
politics, thus resulting in greater electoral participation. 
An exception to this is that farmers fluctuate in their 
electoral participation. To account for this fluctuation, 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone discussed the changing economic 
fortunes of farmers which result from government actions or 
policies and variations in the relationship between farmers 
and government.
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found in their analysis 
of the 1972 presidential election that blacks voted at a 
slightly higher rate than whites. The impact of the 
variable race was highest among less educated blacks. The 
author found a four percent higher probability of voting 
among blacks who had not attended college. Once again, the 
work of Shingles (1981) may be used to explain the 
relationship between race and voter turnout, particularly 
among lower class blacks.
An inclusion of the variable race is very important 
particularly in light of the findings of Abramson and 
Claggett (1989) which differ from those of Wolfinger and
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Rosenstone (1980) and Shingles (1981). Abramson and 
Claggett contended that there are very little, if any, 
differences in voting between whites and blacks. They 
argued that any difference which may be indicated is the 
result of the tendency of blacks to overreport their 
electoral participation.
The variable white registered voters has also been 
included in this analysis, since Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
(1980) found evidence which suggest that white voters were 
more likely to vote when other demographic factors are 
controlled for.
Finally, age was found to be the second most important 
variable in explaining voter turnout. People were found to 
vote at higher rates as they assumed "adult roles."
According to Milbrath and Goel (1977), participation 
increases steadily with age until it reaches a peak in the 
middle years and then gradually declines with old age.
People between the ages of 39 and 69 were more likely to 
vote than the youngest adults. The explanation Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone (1980) provided for this finding is that 
people have more at stake politically later in life than 
when they are younger. For example, according to these 
scholars, individuals with families, homes, and full-time 
employment were more likely to participate than younger 
individuals with less at stake.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5 7
Also related to the relationship between age and 
willingness to vote is the fact that younger voters or those 
younger than the age of 39 are more likely to move or 
relocate than older voters (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone 1980; Squire et al. 1987). Squire et al.
(1987) examined the impact mobilization may have on voter 
turnout. According to Squire et al. (1987, 45),
low voter turnout among young voters may 
be the result of changes in residences 
and the requirement that people must 
register before voting. (Additionally), 
residential mobility has a substantial 
impact on national voter turnout rates, 
since nearly one-third of the nation 
moves ever two years.
An additional variable which has been included as a 
demographic factor which may influence electoral 
participation in judicial elections is the percentage of the 
voting age population residing in rural areas. This 
variable is included in order to account for the expected 
differences in voter turnout between people residing in 
rural and urbanized areas. Key (1949), Campbell et al. 
(1960), and Blank (1974) found a difference in voter turnout 
in rural areas and turnout in urban areas. According to 
these researchers, because of the smaller size of rural 
areas, elections were found to be more salient, thus 
accounting for more electoral participation in these areas. 
They found that people residing in urbanized areas vote at a 
lower rate than those residing in rural areas because of the
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presence of "big government" in urbanized areas. Politics 
and elections in general are viewed as being more personal 
to individuals living in rural areas as opposed to those 
living in urban areas. Furthermore, candidates 
participating in elections in urban areas must spend more to 
inform the public than those in rural areas of the state 
(Blank 1974).
Summary
Of the factors which have been found to have an impact 
on electoral participation in state judicial elections, the 
gender of judicial candidates is viewed as having little, if 
any, influence on voter turnout in judicial contests. A 
second variable which previous research reveal as having a 
slight effect on judicial races is the competitiveness of 
the elections. There are conflicting findings on the 
relationship between the race of judicial candidates and 
voter turnout. Additionally, judicial literature is void of 
examinations on the impact of incumbency on variations in 
voter turnout in judicial elections. In order to determine 
whether such a relationship exists, more research is 
required. The remaining variables— election scheduling, 
election systems, ballot formats, and campaign expenditures- 
-have been found to influence voter turnout in state 
judicial elections.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Chapter Three 
Data and Methodology
The Louisiana judicial election system has been chosen 
as the focal point for this research because data on these 
elections were readily available and allowed the incorpora­
tion of the previously discussed factors as well as other 
relevant variables in a comprehensive model of voter turnout 
in state judicial elections. The data provided by Weber
(1988) and Engstrom (1988) in their examinations of the 
judicial election system of Louisiana have been employed in 
this research. Weber and Engstrom compiled data on the
number of candidates, the campaign spending of some
candidates, the race of each candidate, and the number of 
votes received by each judicial candidate. Weber (1988, 2) 
devised a database in his examination of Louisiana’s 
judicial election processes which is unique, since "no other 
individual or groups had previously constructed a database 
of Louisiana’s judicial election results for the 
contemporary time period."
This aggregate-level analysis includes a total of 94
contested nonpartisan District and Family court and 13 Court
of Appeals elections which took place in the State of 
Louisiana from 1981 to 1988. The years 1981 through 1988 
were selected because campaign finance data recorded during 
this period were found to be more accurate than data
59
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recorded prior to this time. Prior to 1981, it is difficult 
to accurately determine total campaign expenditures in 
Louisiana elections. After 1980, there was a change in the 
forms Louisiana candidates used to report their campaign 
expenditures, thus making it easier to accurately determine 
the amount of money spent by each candidate.
The present study is unique, since it represents the 
first attempt to include and analyze the impact of 
incumbency, campaign spending, the race of judicial 
candidates, and socioeconomic factors on voter turnout 
within the same analysis. In other words, the present study 
includes an analysis of the impact contextual, candidate 
attributes, and demographic variables may have on voter 
turnout in these elections. Appendix Two contains a 
description of each variable as well as the manner in which 
each variable has been operationalized.
Finally, this research differs from other research 
because it focuses on Louisiana district and state 
intermediate appellate court elections. Scholars who have 
conducted studies on judicial elections have chosen for one 
reason or another to exclude Louisiana from their analyses 
or have concerned themselves with state supreme court 
elections (Vines and Jacob 1962; Hannah 1972; Atkins 1976; 
Adamany and Dubois 1976; Dubois 1979, 1980). The major 
reason may have been a problem with the availability of data 
on Louisiana judicial election prior to the 1980s.
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The units of analysis for this dissertation are the 
elections themselves. The primary independent variables—  
incumbency or prior judicial experience, race of the 
candidate, campaign expenditure, the holding of previous 
elective office, type of election (primary or general), and 
sociodemographic characteristics (age, income, education, 
percentage of white registered voters, percentage of the 
total population residing in rural areas, and occupation)—  
are analyzed to determine their impact on electoral 
participation in Louisiana’s judicial elections. The other 
variables which have been examined in previous works and 
discussed in Chapter Two are controlled for in this 
research. The manner in which the primary and control 
variables are operationalized is discussed in later sections 
of this chapter.
An examination of the variables included in this study 
should provide results which answer the following question: 
What is the precise relationship between contextual 
variables, candidate characteristic variables, and 
sociodemographic factors on electoral participation in 
contested nonpartisan judicial elections in the State of 
Louisiana from 1981 to 1988 when other factors are 
controlled for? In other words, this research examines 
which factors provide the best explanation for variations in 
voter turnout in Louisiana’s judicial elections.
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Measuring Voter Turnout
Previous studies have measured voter turnout as the 
number of individuals casting valid ballots in each election 
as a proportion of the voting age population (Campbell et 
al. I960; Gray 1976; Kim et al. 1975). Therefore voter 
turnout in judicial elections is calculated as follows:
# of valid ballots cast in judicial elections
total voting age population X 100
This estimate of turnout should allow a determination of the
age eligible voters who actually cast ballots in judicial
elections.
Population statistics of Louisiana parishes were 
obtained from the Louisiana Secretary of State Office. The 
total voting age population was determined by relying upon 
material from the Louisiana Secretary of State Office as 
well as the 1980 and 1990 census counts. The U.S. Bureau of 
Census’ classification for the age range 18 and older was 
relied upon to measure total voting age population. 
Information from the Louisiana Secretary of State Office was 
employed to control for the impact prison and military 
populations located in certain parishes may have had on 
inflating voting age population. The method of measurement 
utilized to extrapolate voting age population over a seven 
year period (1981-1988) is as follows;
TVAP = TVAP(1990) - TVAP (1980) = RESULT / TVAP (1980) 
= RESULT / 10 (represents year range, 1990-1980)
= RESULT * TVAP (n) = RESULT + TVAP (1980)
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Where n = election year, e.g., 1 = 1981, 2 = 
1982, 3 = 1983, etc.
In addition to measuring overall turnout in judicial 
elections, Dubois (1979) also measured "rolloff" in state 
supreme court elections. Rolloff occurs when voters 
participate in "major partisan offices" at the top of the 
ballot but fail to cast ballots in the judicial elections. 
The "major partisan race" is defined as the presidential, 
gubernatorial, or United States senatorial contest which 
attracted the most voters in each election year" (Dubois 
1979, 871). In other words, voters are more likely to 
participate in more salient races at the top of ballot. The 
rationale for this finding is twofold. First, voters may 
perceive the major office at the top of the ballot as 
directly affecting their everyday lives. For example, 
voters may participate in such elections because the issues- 
-taxation or foreign policy— involved in such contests 
affect them in some way. Second, the issues in the major 
partisan races are more clear cut than those in judicial 
races (Kenney 1983).
The present study does not measure rolloff. The reason 
being that rolloff has customarily been measured to 
determine the impact ballot format may have on voter 
turnout. However, Louisiana has exclusively utilized the 
office-block election ballot during the time period included 
in this analysis. For this reason, it is not necessary to
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measure rolloff in this analysis. Researchers have 
demonstrated that rolloff does occur in judicial elections, 
therefore the present study focuses solely on the factors 
which may account for variations in voter turnout in 
judicial elections. The variable election scheduling is a 
more appropriate variable for analysis purposes than ballot 
format. The inclusion of the variable election scheduling 
will measure and capture the effect concurrent presidential, 
congressional, or gubernatorial elections may have on 
electoral participation in state judicial elections. The 
variable election scheduling will be discussed in the next 
section.
Measurement of Variables in Contextual Model
Election Scheduling
Judicial research scholars have employed the "surge and 
decline" theory of Angus Campbell (1966) to explain 
variations in voter turnout. Hannah (1972) and Adamany and 
Dubois (1976) followed Campbell’s example when examining 
voter turnout in state supreme court elections. The 
election scheduling theory rests on the assumption that 
voter turnout in state judicial elections will be highest at 
presidential general elections, followed by congressional 
election dates, and high visibility state and local 
elections (gubernatorial and mayoral) held during off-years. 
This theory of voter turnout suggests the following 
hypotheses :
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H,: With all else being equal, state judicial
elections held concurrently with presidential 
general elections will have the highest 
turnout.
HE: With all else being equal, state judicial
elections held concurrently with mid-term 
congressional elections will have moderate 
levels of voter turnout.
Ha : State judicial elections held concurrently
with high visibility state and local races, 
ceteris paribus, will have the lowest levels 
of voter turnout.
The theoretical basis for the above hypotheses rests on the 
work of Adamany and Dubois (1976) and their reference to the 
work of Campbell (1966). According to Adamany and Dubois 
(1976, 743),
the surge and decline theory may also 
have meaning for concurrent and 
nonconcurrent state supreme court 
elections. Core voters may dominate 
nonconcurrent judicial elections. In 
concurrent supreme court races 
peripheral voters join the judicial 
electorate, drawn to the polls by the 
presidential primary or perhaps by 
significant referenda.
The rationale underlying the above hypotheses as well 
as the work of Adamany and Dubois is that there will be a 
surge in voter participation in judicial elections held 
during presidential and congressional election years because 
such salient races attract core voters as well as peripheral 
voters. However, judicial elections which occur during off- 
years or at special elections are dominated by the
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participation of core voters. This accounts for the decline 
in voter participation during off-years.
Judicial election scheduling is captured by the 
inclusion of a series of dummy variables. Judicial races 
which occurred during a presidential year are coded "1" and 
those which did not occur during a presidential general 
election are scored "0". Elections which occurred during 
congressional elections are scored "1", those occurring 
during noncongressional elections are coded "0". Judicial 
elections scheduled during a high visibility election (e.g., 
mayoral or gubernatorial race) are scored "1", and "0" 
otherwise.
Election Svstems
The variable election systems cannot be theoretically 
nor empirically included in the present analysis, even 
though Louisiana is a unique case, with the party 
affiliation of judicial candidates printed on the ballot in 
nonpartisan races. It is necessary to exclude the variable 
election systems because there is no available data from the 
State of Louisiana which would allow for comparisons among 
the different types of election systems (nonpartisan, 
partisan, mixed, and merit retention). Louisiana has relied 
exclusively upon the nonpartisan election system. As a 
result, it is impossible to determine whether election 
systems have had an impact on voter turnout in Louisiana’s 
judicial elections.
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Additionally, even the inclusion of a variable scoring 
party identification (Democrat or Republican) will add 
little or nothing to this analysis, since the manner in 
which state trial and intermediate appellate court elections 
are conducted or the diminished importance of political 
parties in such elections is different from other elections 
( e.g., presidential, gubernatorial, mayoral, or 
senatorial). Judicial candidates must adhere to the 
American Bar Association’s Code of Judicial Conduct. This 
Code places restraints on the behaviors of judicial 
candidates and prevents them from expressing their opinions 
on public policy issues.
According to Dubois (1980, 66),
if judicial candidates compete on 
partisan ballots, they are permitted by 
the Code to acknowledge a connection 
with a political party, but the campaign 
necessarily must remain formally 
nonprogrammatic. And in states 
utilizing the nonpartisan nomination and 
election method of selection, state law 
usually prohibits political party 
organizations from offering endorsements 
to candidates and from engaging in 
direct or indirect campaign activity on 
behalf of a (judicial) candidate.
In other words, even though the party identifications of 
candidates are printed on the election ballot, state 
judicial candidates are not viewed as having or embracing a 
party platform, therefore, the influence of party 
affiliation is probably negligible. Following the same line
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
68
of argument, the party affiliation of state judicial 
candidates has not been found to bring voters to the polls 
or increase voter turnout (Dubois 1980). On the other hand 
this variable has an impact when serving as a voting cue for 
voters once they have decided to participate in the election 
(Dubo i s 1984) .
Finally, states like Louisiana have traditionally been 
dominated by one of the two major political parties. For 
this reason, limited competition between the Democrat and 
Republican parties result in party affiliation playing an 
insignificant role in drawing voters to the polls. Instead 
partisanship is expected to serve as a voting cue which 
affect the outcome of elections rather than a catalyst which 
draws voters to the polls.
Ballot Format
The variable ballot format has been excluded from this 
analysis because Louisiana has exclusively utilized the 
office block or Massachusetts ballot. This ballot groups 
candidates according to the office being contested, 
regardless of their party identifications. Louisiana’s 
reliance upon one specific type of ballot for many years 
prevents a determination of the impact different ballot 
formats might have on electoral participation in judicial 
elections, particularly during the time period under 
consideration in the present analysis.
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Competitiveness
Previous studies of the relationship between 
competitiveness and voter turnout in state judicial 
elections have suggested findings which add little or 
nothing to the explanatory power of voter turnout models of 
judicial elections (Hannah 1972; Dubois 1980). Despite the 
findings of these researchers, the variable competitiveness 
has been included in this study. The basic argument with 
regards to this variable is that judicial contests, 
specifically those which occur in rural areas, are more 
likely to be competitive races. The rationale underlying 
this contention is that voters are more familiar with the 
names as well as policy concerns of judicial candidates as a 
result of the size of rural districts. In most rural areas, 
particularly those in Louisiana, everyone knows everyone.
As a result, the few lawyers in such areas are well-known, 
and people view the electoral success of judicial candidates 
as a form of personal politics. Additionally, a preliminary 
run of the data revealed that voter turnout was higher in 
elections held in districts located in rural areas as 
opposed to those elections held in urban judicial districts. 
For this reason, competitiveness has been included in this 
analysis.
The competitive theory of electoral turnout in judicial 
elections is based on the following hypothesis;
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H*; Ceteris paribus, electoral participation is 
expected to be greatest in competitive 
contests.
Competition is measured according to the traditional 
method (Key 1949; Gray 1976; Hannah 1972) as the total votes 
received by the winner minus the total votes received by the 
runner-up as a proportion of the total votes cast in each 
election. In other words, competition is measured as 
fo1lows :
COMPETITION = total winner votes — total runner—up votes
total votes cast
The lower the percentage which results when using this 
method, the more competitive the judicial election.
Type of Election
A variable which judicial scholars has not considered 
in their research is type of election— general and primary. 
Hannah (1972), Dubois and Adamany (1976), and Dubois (1980) 
have examined the impact election scheduling may have on 
voter turnout, but these scholars have not included the 
impact type of election may have on electoral participation 
in judicial contests.
Existing literature on presidential and congressional 
races have suggested that whether an election is a primary 
or general election has an impact on voter turnout (Key 
1949; Boyd 1989; Wright 1989). These researchers have found 
conflicting findings on the impact the type of election may
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have on voter turnout. Key concluded that turnout is 
greater in general elections rather than primary elections. 
According to Key, the electorate that participates in 
primary elections is different from the electorate that 
participates in general elections. Key referred to the 
former voters as "core" voters and the latter as 
"peripheral" voters. Core voters possess a high level of 
interest in politics or issues and are more likely to 
participate in the electoral process. On the other hand, 
peripheral voters are drawn to the polls by popular races 
such as presidential general elections.
In contrast to Key’s findings are the findings of Boyd 
(1989) and Wright (1989). In their respective works, they 
concluded that electoral participation is higher in primary 
elections rather than runoff primaries and general 
elections. Unlike Key’s core and peripheral voter theory, 
Boyd and Wright argue that the electorate is more likely to 
participate in the first election— primary election, rather 
than the second election— runoff primary or general 
election.
Despite the findings of Boyd (1989) and Wright (1989), 
the work of Key (1949) serves as the theoretical basis for 
the hypotheses contained in this section. The following 
hypotheses are contained in the type of election theory of 
voter turnout in state judicial elections:
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Hg : Ceteris paribus, electoral participation will
be greater in general elections.
H*: Ceteris paribus» electoral participation will
decrease in primary elections.
The variable type of election is scored "1" for general 
elections and "0" for primary elections. Even though the 
variable has been operationalized in this manner, the 
statistical method employed indicates whether Key’s or Boyd 
and Wright’s contentions are more accurate in explaining the 
impact the type of election may have on voter turnout, 
specifically in judicial races.
Measurement of Variables in Candidate Model
Gender
The gender of judicial candidates has not been found to 
have a significant impact on voter turnout (Dubois 1980). 
Unfortunately, the available data on Louisiana does not 
contain an adequate number of contests in which women were 
participants to permit a measure of the relationship between 
gender and electoral participation.
Race
A race-based theory of voter turnout in state judicial 
elections has as its foundation the work of scholars who 
have found evidence which suggest that the presence of a 
black candidate in a judicial contest stimulates electoral 
participation (Collins 1980; Atkins et al. 1984). This 
theory of voter turnout suggests the following hypotheses:
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H,: With all else being equal, the presence of a
black judicial candidate on the ballot will 
encourage black and overall' voter turnout.
H g : The presence of a black candidate in a
judicial race, ceteris paribus, will make the 
contest more salient, thus increasing white 
and overall voter turnout.
The theoretical basis for the above hypotheses rests on 
the works of Collins (1980) and Atkins et al. (1984). These 
authors found evidence which suggest that the presence of a 
black political candidate does increase black voter turnout, 
particularly among lower income blacks. This observed trend 
in voter turnout among black voters of lower socioeconomic 
status may be theoretically explained by the work of 
Shingles (1981).
According to Shingles, an increase in electoral 
participation among lower income blacks may be attributed to 
black consciousness and a feeling of civic duty. In other 
words, lower income blacks vote, particularly when a black 
person seeks public office, because they mistrust government 
and perceive their votes as promoting change and 
accountability in government. In a similar vein, lower 
income blacks have high levels of political involvement—  
voting— because they feel it is their duty to vote, 
especially after the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.
The work of Pitkin also provides an explanation for 
increased black participation when black candidates seek 
public office. Pitkin (1967) distinguished between two
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types of representation. The first type is descriptive in 
which voters vote for candidates who possess similar ethnic, 
racial, or socioeconomic characteristics as themselves. The 
second type of representation is substantive in which voters 
vote for public officials they feel have similar policy 
concerns as themselves. It is the former type of 
representation which accounts for an increase in black voter 
turnout when a black person seeks judicial office.
The independent variable race is measured 
conventionally as a dichotomous dummy variable. This 
variable is scored "1" for black judicial candidates and "0" 
for white candidates.
Campaign Spending
Of interest in this analysis is the overall voter 
turnout in each election. For this reason, the total 
campaign spending of each election contest is included.
A theory of campaign spending to explain voter turnout 
in state judicial elections is based on the works of Adamany 
(1972) and Dubois (1986). The following hypothesis is 
suggested by such a theory:
H,: An increase in campaign spending will
increase voter participation in judicial 
elections, ceteris paribus.
The variable campaign spending is calculated in a 
similar manner as the measurement used by Cox and Munger 
(1989). In order to control for the effects the size of a
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district may have on campaign spending, expenditure is 
measured as total expenditure in each election as a 
proportion of the district’s voting age population.
Campaign finance information was drawn from reports 
filed by each judicial candidate with Louisiana Campaign 
Finance Office. Appendix Three contains a copy of the form 
employed to record expenditure data on each judicial 
candidate. Expenditure data was collected on more than 200 
candidates who participated in Louisiana trial and 
intermediate appellate judicial elections from 1981 through 
1988.
Incumbencv or Prior Judicial Experience
Judicial election studies are void of an examination of 
the relationship between incumbency or prior judicial 
experience and voter turnout in contested nonpartisan races. 
As a result, an explanatory theory of incumbency must rely 
upon the works of congressional scholars (Erikson 1971; 
Abramowitz 1975; Alford and Hibbing 1981; Jacobson 1987; 
Ansolabehere et al. 1988; Bauer and Hibbing 1989).
An incumbency-based theory of voter turnout in state 
judicial elections suggests the following hypothesis:
H With all else being equal, an election
involving an incumbent will stimulate voter 
turnout.
Incumbency is measured as a dichotomous dummy variable 
scored "1" for elections in which an incumbent or an
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individual with prior judicial experience was seeking 
reelection and "0" for elections which did not involve an 
incumbent. Measuring incumbency in this manner differs from 
studies which have scored incumbency as years of continuous 
tenure in office (Patterson and Caldeira 1983). Such a 
measure of incumbency has been excluded from this analysis, 
since using such a method would add little or nothing to the 
explanatory power of electoral participation in state 
judicial elections. Prior judicial experience has been 
included for analysis purposes instead of incumbency in 
order to allow for the inclusion of those judges who may 
have been appointed as a result of a vacancy on the bench, 
lost the special election, yet were successfully in securing 
judgeships in subsequent judicial contests.
Elective Office
The theory underlying this variable is that candidates 
who have previously held elective office (e.g.. District 
Attorney, counciIperson) will have an impact on voter 
turnout in judicial elections. The following hypothesis is 
suggested by this theory:
H,,: With all else being equal, elections
involving candidates who have previously held 
elective office will increase voter turnout.
The variable elective office is scored "1" if the 
candidate has held elective office, excluding a judgeship
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which is captured by the incumbency variable, and "0" if the 
candidate has not held elective office.
Measurement of Variables in Sociodemographic Model
Sociodemooraohic Variables
A sociodemographic theory of voter turnout suggests the 
following hypotheses:
H W i t h  all else being equal, elections held in 
districts with voters of high levels of 
educational attainment are more likely to be 
associated with high levels of voter turnout.
H,a: With all else being equal, elections held in
districts with voters of high incomes should 
be characterized with high levels of voter 
turnout.
H W i t h  all else being equal, judicial elections 
held in districts consisting of professionals 
or white-collar workers should be associated 
with high levels of voter turnout.
HjaZ Elections held in districts with large
percentages of white voters are expected to 
have high levels of electoral participation, 
ceteris paribus.
H With all being equal, elections held in
districts consisting of lower income blacks 
should be characterized by high levels of 
voter turnout.
H W i t h  all else being equal, elections held in 
districts located in rural areas should be 
characterized by high levels of electoral 
participation.
H|e: Ceteris paribus, elections held in districts
consisting of voters ranging in age from 35 
through 69 should be associated with high 
levels of electoral participation.
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The rationale for the first five hypotheses is based on the 
work of Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980). The authors 
describe and explain which personal characteristics 
possessed by the electorate are most likely to encourage 
them to vote in presidential general elections. Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone classified the electorate on the basis of 
demographic characteristic (age, income, education, 
occupation, sex, and race) and contextual variables (state 
voter registration laws, concurrent elections, political 
cultures).
Despite the findings of Verba and Nie (1972), Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone (1980), and Squire et al. (1987); the age 
range 35 through 69 was examined in this study because the 
Census Bureau’s classification of age is based upon four 
year periods. For example, the categories for age as 
classified by the U.S. Census Bureau are 30 to 34, 35 to 39, 
40 to 44, etc. Thirty-five through sixty-nine was selected 
as the age group in the present study because selecting the 
age range 40 to 69 would ignore the impact "Baby Boomers" 
(those aged 35 to 40) may have on explaining variations in 
electoral participation.
The variable rural has been included in this research 
because the findings of Key (1949), Campbell et al. (1960), 
and Blank (1974) suggest that voter turnout should be higher 
in elections held in rural areas rather than in those held 
in urban areas. To account for this difference in electoral
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participation in rural areas, these scholars contend that 
politics in rural areas is more personal because of the 
absence of "Big Government."
The variable rural is measured as the percentage of the 
total population within each district that resides in rural 
areas. The definition of "rural" and the classification 
relied upon to code this variable is based on information 
from the United States Bureau of Census.
The other sociodemographic variables are operational­
ized either as a percentage or a median representing the 
overall characteristics of the electorate within the 
parishes in which judicial elections occurred. Family 
income will be scored as median family income, education as 
a percentage of high school graduates in each district, age 
as the percentage of the population between the ages of 35 
and 69, black income as the median family income for blacks, 
white collar workers as the percentage of workers in each 
parish who are white collar workers. The operationalization 
of the variables white collar is based upon the work of 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) in which they classified 
white collar workers as professional and technical workers 
as well as farmers, managers, administrators, and clerks and 
salespeople. The variable black median family income has 
been included to determine whether lower income blacks are 
more likely to vote.
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Finally» the percent of white registered voters in each 
parish is measured as a proportion of total registered 
voters. This method of measurement is relied upon in order 
to eliminate the problem which arises when attempting to 
calculate white voting age population as a proportion of the 
total voting age population. The problem with utilizing the 
latter method is that is difficult to accurately measure the 
increase or decrease in the populations within parishes on 
the basis of race when relying upon estimates of the total 
voting age population. The presence of prisons and military 
bases within some parishes also presented a measurement 
problem. Additionally, providing an accurate count of 
"other" voters (e.g., Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, 
and Blacks) of voting age presented a problem. For these 
reasons, the variable white registered voters was a better 
indicator for white voters and allowed the elimination of 
many inaccuracies which may have occurred had white voting 
age population been used.
The data provided for the sociodemographic variables 
were drawn from books published by the United States Bureau 
of Census. Data on white registered voters were obtained 
from the Louisiana Office of Secretary of State.
Summary
The data were obtained from official documents 
published by the State of Louisiana and the United States 
government. Voter registration figures and election
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statistics were gathered from publications issued by the 
Louisiana Office of Secretary of State and the works of 
Weber (1988, 1989) and Engstrom (1988). Incumbency or prior 
judicial experience and elective office were drawn from The 
American Bench: Judges of the Nation. Campaign expenditure
information were obtained from official documents available 
in Louisiana’s Campaign Finance Office. The socioeconomic 
data were obtained from Census of Population published by 
the United States Department of Commerce.
The statistical tests utilized to estimate the 
parameters of my comprehensive model as well as three 
separate models of voter turnout in Louisiana's judicial 
elections are discussed in Chapter Four. The results of the 
empirical tests for the previously discussed hypotheses are 
also contained in the following chapter.
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Multivariate Analysis
The dependent variable in this study is turnout percent 
in each election. Turnout percent is standardized as a 
proportion of the total vote received by all the candidates 
competing in each election divided by the total voting age 
population within each district.
Four separate aggregate-level models have been devised 
to explain electoral participation in state nonpartisan 
trial and appellate court elections. The four models 
contain a contextual component, characteristics of 
candidates’ attributes, the sociodemographic characteristics 
of the electorate within each district, and an integrated or 
general model containing variables from the first three 
models. In other words, the impact of the variables 
included in each model is measured separately with the use 
of standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients 
and in a general multivariate analysis which integrates 
components of the three models. The Pearson Correlation 
Coefficient has also been employed to measure the bivariate 
relationship between the dependent and independent 
var iables.
The model has also been tested for violation of 
assumptions (multico11inearity, heteroscedasticity, and 
autocorrelation). These tests have been conducted, since
82
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the data employed in this research resulted in pooled cross- 
sectional data. Cross-sectional data are data "in which the 
researcher has observations on a set of variables at a given 
point in time across many nations, states, counties, cities, 
or other units of analysis" (Ostrom 1978, 5). In this 
analysis the independent variables are examined for judicial 
elections which occurred from 1981 through 1988. In other 
words, the characteristics of the candidates, attributes of 
the electorate, and the political environment in which the 
elections occurred are analyzed in Louisiana nonpartisan 
contested judicial elections from 1981 through 1988 to 
determine the impact these factors may have on electoral 
participation.
Multicollinearity occurs when independent variables in 
a regression model are intercorrelated. The variables 
special election, percent black high school graduates, and 
percent white high school graduates have been excluded from 
the models because of the presence of multicollinearity.
The first test conducted to test for this problem was 
to examine the bivariate coefficients to determine the 
relationship between each independent variable and other 
variables. The cutoff point employed to eliminate the 
previously mentioned variables was .80. In short, 
independent variables yielding bivariate coefficients equal 
to or exceeding .80 were excluded from the models. It is 
important to emphasize that there were some variables which
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were expected to and did correlate with other independent 
variables. For example, black median family income was 
expected to have a high correlation with median family 
income, since black family income is a subset of overall 
family income. Similarly, white-collar and blue-collar 
workers were expected to correlate because both factors are 
required to determine overall workers in the population.
The variable blue-collar worker has not been selected for 
inclusion in the present study because it was not 
hypothesized as increasing levels of voter turnout. Since 
some variables were expected to correlate with other 
variables, other statistical tests were performed to aid in 
the determination as to whether multicollinearity was in 
fact a problem.
A second statistical test which has been performed to 
detect multicollinearity was to regress each independent 
variable on the remaining independent variables. The 
excluded variables had a R2 close to 1.00. This procedure 
allowed for a determination of which variable was linearly 
related to other independent variables.
The final test which has been performed to detect the 
presence of multicollinearity is the examination of the 
stability of coefficients of the independent variables when 
placed in different samples or models. The coefficients for 
the variables which have been excluded indicated a dramatic
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change in the magnitude of the coefficient estimates across 
different specifications of the models.
Since the data analyzed in this research resulted in a 
pooled cross-sectional time model, the independent variables 
were tested to detect the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
Heteroscedasticity refers to the situation in which—  
contrary to the assumption of homoscedasticity— the error 
term in a regression model does not have constant variance 
(Berry and Feldman 1985). In other words, variance in the 
error term varies as the value of the independent variable 
increases.
To test for this violation of assumption, a residual 
variable has been created in which the absolute values of 
the residual have been regressed on all independent 
variables. The bivariate correlation coefficients between 
the residual and the independent variables were examined to 
determine whether heteroscedasticity was a problem. Table 
One contains the coefficients of the bivariate correlation 
of the residual with the independent variable.
Since the independent variables race, campaign 
expenditure, and white registered voters appeared to 
correlate with the residual in the bivariate analysis, T- 
test were conducted to determine the significance of this 
correlation. The results of the T-test for these variables 
indicate that their correlation with the residual is not 
statistically significant. The significance of t for the
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variable race yielded a coefficient of +.3012, for campaign 
expenditure +.2100, and for white registered voters +.1952. 
These tests indicate that heteroscedasticity was not a 
problem in this analysis of voter turnout in judicial 
elections.
Finally, the cross-sectional data relied upon in this 
study has been tested to determine whether autocorrelation 
presented a problem. Autocorrelation or serial correlation 
occurs when observations at different points in time are 
correlated. The Durbin-Watson d-statistic has been employed 
to test for autocorrelation. The Durbin test is based on a 
theoretical distribution. The d-statistic was expected to 
be small for positive autocorrelation, large for negative 
autocorrelation, and in the middle range for randomly 
scattered residuals. To be more specific, "if the residuals 
are highly positively correlated, the values of d is near 
zero; if they are uncorrelated it is near 2" (Kendall 1976, 
164).
The d-statistic yielded by the residuals in the present 
research was +1.5971. This statistic indicates that no 
serial correlation occurred.
In addition to performing the d-statistic test, 
scatterplots of the residuals against the predicted values 
were examined. The plots did not reveal a pattern between 
the residuals and predicted values, instead the values were 
randomly scattered. The results of the scatterplots were
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Table One
Coefficients Resulting from a Test 
to Detect Heteroscedasticity
Variable Pearson Coefficient
RACE — .2358*
PRIOR JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE — .1696
PRIOR ELECTIVE OFFICE +.1773
CAMPAIGN SPENDING +.2169*
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES 1819
AGE +.1667
RURAL PERCENT +.0949
WHITE REGISTERED VOTERS +.2319*
COMPETITION +.0871
MEDIAN INCOME +.0302
HIGH VISIBILITY ELECTION -.0197
WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS -.1645
BLACK MEDIAN INCOME +.1178
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -.1458
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION -.1316
TYPE OF ELECTION +.0697
■«•Significant at .01 level
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similar to the results of the d-statistic. It may be 
concluded that autocorrelation was not present in the data 
employed in this research.
The purpose of measuring the influence the variables 
contained in these models may have on voter turnout is to 
determine the extent to which the present research adds to, 
supports, or conflicts with existing studies on judicial 
elections.
Results of Contextual Model
The contextual model contains those independent 
variables which are indicators of the prevailing political 
and structural context of each election. This model of 
voter turnout may be statistically depicted as follows:
TURNOUT = a + b ' (presidential election) + b* 
(congressional election) + b' (high 
visibility election) + b " (competitiveness) + 
b® (type of election
The variables presidential election, congressional 
election, and competitiveness are included in this model 
because existing research has revealed a relationship 
between these variables and electoral participation in 
judicial elections (Hannah 1972; Adamany and Dubois 1976; 
Dubois 1980). These researchers found evidence which 
suggest that the variable competitiveness has a slight 
influence on voter turnout. Competitiveness was also found 
to have a greater impact on the behaviors of candidates with
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regards to seeking campaign funds or the manner in which 
they conducted their campaigns rather than encouraging 
people to participate in these election (Boyd 1989). The 
variable competitiveness has been included to determine 
whether these findings are valid for state nonpartisan trial 
and intermediate appellate court elections.
Hannah (1972) and Adamany and Dubois (1976) analyzed 
election scheduling in their respective works. These 
researchers found evidence which suggest that voter turnout 
in judicial elections was greatest in those elections held 
concurrently with presidential elections followed by 
congressional elections. Turnout was found to be lowest in 
off-year elections.
For analyses purposes, the variable election scheduling 
has been divided into three separate dummy variables to 
explain variations in voter turnout in state judicial 
elections. These variables are presidential election, 
congressional election, and high visibility election (e.g., 
gubernatorial and mayoral races). The variable off-year 
election has been excluded from this analysis, since a 
preliminary run of the data revealed a multicollinearity 
problem with the variable off-year (special) election and 
the variables presidential election and congressional 
election. Furthermore, the effects of this variable will be 
captured by the inclusion of the variable high visibility 
election.
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The variable type of election has also been included in 
the contextual model. Previously discussed literature have 
suggested that whether an election is a primary or general 
election has an impact on voter turnout (Key 1949; Boyd 
1989; Wright 1989).
The following sections contain discussions of the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter Three and whether the data 
support or contradict the expected findings. The 
coefficients for the variables contained in the contextual 
model are illustrated in Table Two. This model of voter 
turnout in judicial elections explains 33 percent of the 
variance in electoral participation in Louisiana contested 
nonpartisan judicial elections.
Election Scheduling
H : : With all else being equal, state judicial
elections held concurrently with presidential 
elections will have the highest level of 
voter turnout.
Of the three variables (high visibility election, 
presidential election, congressional election) included to 
explain the relationship between election scheduling and 
voter turnout, the standardized regression coefficient for 
the variable presidential election indicates the weakest 
correlation with voter turnout. Surprisingly, the 
coefficient for this variable suggest that this variable did 
not have a significant impact on electoral participation in 
the judicial elections examined in the present study.
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Table Two
Pearson Correlation Coefficients and 
Standardized and Unstandardized Regression Coefficients 
for Variables Included in Contextual Model
Pearson
Variable Correlation b Beta Gig. of T
Presidential Election +.005 -.062 -.093 +.1420
Congressional Election +.327** +.132 + .416 +.0000***
High Visibility
Election +.352** +.157 + .429 +.0000***
Competitiveness -.246* -1,420 — . 166 
E-03
+.0302**
Type of Election -.110 -.022 — . 060 +.2429
R2 = +.33
***<.01, one-tail test 
**<.05, one-tail test 
*<.10, one-tail test
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One plausible explanation for the weak correlation 
between the variable presidential election and electoral 
participation in the present research and the strong 
correlation found by Hannah (1972), Adamany and Dubois 
(1976), and Dubois (1980) may be that the factors which 
affect state trial and intermediate appellate court 
elections are different from those which affect state 
supreme court elections, particularly when the char­
acteristics of the electorate within specific districts 
are taken into consideration.
The weak correlation between the variable presidential 
election and voter turnout in judicial elections may also be 
attributed to the nonpartisan judicial ballot. Even though 
Louisiana includes the party affiliation of judicial 
candidates on the judicial ballot, the presence of party 
identification and the coattail effect has been found to 
have little significance in explaining voter turnout in 
Louisiana nonpartisan judicial elections.
Additionally, the performance of the variable 
presidential election may be explained by "rolloff".
Rolloff is defined as "the tendency of weary or confused 
voters to refrain from voting on offices or measures located 
near the bottom of a lengthy ballot" (Walker 1966). As a 
result, rolloff is more likely to occur in less salient 
contests such as judicial elections which are held 
concurrently with more salient race such as presidential
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general. In other words, in this analysis it is likely that 
voters who participated in presidential elections did not 
complete their ballots or participate in the less salient 
judicial races.
The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that holding 
judicial elections at the same time as presidential general 
elections did not encourage voter participation in the 
judicial elections being analyzed. The performance of this 
variable supports and conflicts in part with existing 
studies (Hannah 1972; Adamany and Dubois 1976; Dubois 1980). 
According to Hannah (1972) and Dubois (1980), in part, in 
their respective studies, judicial elections held 
concurrently with presidential general elections are 
expected to have the greatest influence on voter turnout. 
Dubois (1980) also concluded that the impact of a concurrent 
presidential election on nonpartisan judicial elections may 
be negligible. This finding of Dubois may be used to 
explain the performance of the variable presidential 
election in the present study which focuses on nonpartisan 
judicial contests. The coefficients revealed by this 
variable validate the exclusion of the partisan 
identification of judicial candidates, even though Louisiana 
provides this information on the judicial ballot in 
nonpartisan races.
HB: With all else being equal, state judicial 
elections held concurrently with mid-term
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congressional elections will have moderate 
levels of voter turnout.
The explanatory power of the variable congressional 
election was found to be greater than that of the variable 
presidential election. This finding differs from the 
findings of Hannah (1972), Adamany and Dubois (1976), and 
Dubois (1980). The variable congressional election yielded 
a statistically significant positive correlation with the 
dependent variable voter turnout. The coefficients for this 
variable indicate that state judicial elections held 
concurrently with congressional races did increase voter 
participation in the judicial contests.
Like the variable presidential election, the 
performance of the variable congressional election in the 
present study as opposed to its performance in existing 
studies (Hannah 1972; Adamany and Dubois 1976; Dubois 1979, 
1980) may be attributed to the units of analysis— non­
partisan contested trial court elections— employed in this 
research. The units of analysis in existing studies have 
been state supreme court elections. Therefore, it may be 
concluded that the factors which influence electoral 
participation in state nonpartisan trial and intermediate 
appellate court elections may be different from those 
influencing participation in state supreme court contests. 
Additionally, voters may view the election of congressional 
candidates as having a greater impact on their daily lives 
and economic well-being than presidential elections. Many
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
95
congressional candidates are incumbents who have established 
name familiarity with voters and have earned the loyalty of 
their constituents. On the other hand, most presidential 
candidates are more likely to be newcomers rather than 
incumbents. As a result, the choices in congressional races 
may be clearer to voters than their choices in presidential 
contests. In fact, voters may be less likely to experience 
stress when voting for congressional candidates and 
therefore participate in the judicial contests located at 
the bottom of the ballot.
Another explanation for the performance of the variable 
congressional election is that Louisiana judicial elections 
are usually scheduled to coincide with congressional 
elections. For this reason, many voters who are drawn to 
the polls for the salient congressional elections also cast 
ballots in the judicial races.
Though the magnitude of the relationship between 
congressional election and voter turnout remained in a 
positive direction, there was a significant increase in the 
explanatory power of the variable congressional election 
once placed in the regression equation. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient for this variable is +.327. 
Controlling for other contextual variables enhances the 
relationship between congressional election and electoral 
participation. The Beta coefficient for this variable is 
+.4 1 6 .
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Ha : State judicial elections held concurrently
with high visibility or off-year races, 
ceteris paribus, will have low levels of 
voter turnout.
The variable high visibility election was found to have 
a significant influence on voter turnout in the state non­
partisan trial court elections analyzed in this study. High 
visibility elections are those gubernatorial and mayoral 
contests which occurred in Louisiana from 1981 through 1988. 
These elections were classified as high visibility elections 
because they occur during nonpresidential and noncongres- 
sional elections, yet have the tendency to draw voters to 
the polls with nearly the same intensity as presidential 
general elections and U.S. Senatorial races. The 
performance of this variable in the contextual model 
indicates that Louisiana voters participated at a higher 
level in judicial elections when high visibility races were 
on the ballot. The Pearson correlation coefficient for this 
variable is +.352. The standardized regression coefficient 
(Beta) is +.429.
The coefficients for the variable high visibility 
election captured the effect of Hannah (1972), Adamany and 
Dubois (1976), Dubois’ (1980) variable off-year election. 
These scholars’ off-year elections were those held during 
nonpresidential and noncongressiona1 elections and are 
therefore comparable to the variable high visibility 
election in the present study. The positive Beta 
coefficient for this variable contradicts the findings of
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these scholars. These researchers found evidence which 
suggest that electoral participation .should be lowest in 
judicial elections held concurrently with off-year 
elections.
The significant positive correlation of the variable 
high visibility election with the dependent variable voter 
turnout suggests that Louisiana voters were more likely to 
participate in judicial contests held concurrently with high 
visibility contests from 1981 to 1988. The explanation for 
this finding follows the same logic as the one presented to 
explain the performance of the variable congressional 
election. In short, voters perceive a personal stake in 
high visibility elections (gubernatorial or mayoral). 
Additionally, the name familiarity of the candidates 
participating in these races and the saliency of the 
contests at the top of the ballot may encourage voters to 
participate in the judicial elections.
Another factor which may explain the coefficients 
yielded for the variable high visibility election is the 
campaign expenditures of gubernatorial and mayoral 
candidates. These candidates spend large sums of money 
during their campaigns, thus making the elections more 
salient to voters and in turn increase voter turnout 
(Patterson and Caldeira 1983). This increased voter 
interest and turnout in the high visibility elections may be
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carried over to the judicial races located at the bottom of 
the ballot.
Finally, the elections of governors and mayors may be 
viewed by many voters as state and local races. Conversely, 
voters may view the election of the president as a national 
election. Voters distinguishing between state and local and 
national races may result in them not casting ballots in 
state and local races, specifically judicial contests, which 
are included on the election ballot for president. Con­
versely, voters may participate in judicial races held 
concurrently with congressional, gubernatorial or mayoral 
races because they view these contests as state or local 
races. It may be possible that not only are more salient 
races located at the top of the ballot given preference by 
voters, but national races may be given higher priority than 
state and local contests when included on the same ballot.
Boyd’s <1989) ballot attractiveness hypothesis supports 
the above arguments to some degree. According to the 
author, an individual is less likely to vote when there is a 
fewer number of salient statewide contests on a presidential 
ballot. This hypothesis provides a contrasting argument to 
those of Campbell (1966), Hannah (1972), Adamany and Dubois 
(1976), and Dubois (1980) which state that voter turnout 
increase as a result of presidential elections and mid-term 
elections. Unlike these researchers, Boyd contended that is 
local statewide contests such as gubernatorial races which
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increase voter turnout in presidential races. According to 
Boyd (1989, 738), "gubernatorial races on a presidential 
year ballot increase voting rates by six percentage points, 
drawing people to the polls who would not otherwise vote in 
presidential elections." Even though Boyd’s conclusions 
differ somewhat from the findings of this study, the present 
research as well Boyd’s suggests that voters do distinguish 
between a national race (presidential) and state 
(congressional and gubernatorial) and local (mayoral) races.
Boyd’s ballot attractiveness hypothesis may account for 
the performances of the variable presidential election and 
that of the variables congressional and high visibility 
election. Judicial elections held concurrently with local 
and statewide races had higher levels of electoral 
participation than those held during presidential elections.
Competitiveness
H * : With all else being equal, electoral
participation is expected to be greatest in 
competitive contests.
The coefficients for the variable competitiveness 
reveal a positive correlation with the dependent variable 
voter turnout. The Pearson coefficient yielded by this 
independent variable was -.246. The standardized regression 
coefficient for this variable was -.166. The one-tail 
significance test indicated a statistically significant 
relationship between competitiveness and voter turnout in 
Louisiana judicial elections. The negative magnitude of the
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standardized coefficient for this variable was expected, 
since competitiveness was measuring as the percentage which 
result when dividing the winner votes minus the runnei— up 
votes by the total votes cast in each election. The smaller 
the percentage which resulted, the more competitive the 
judicial race. For this reason, in spite of the negative 
beta coefficient for the independent variable competitive­
ness, it was found to encourage voter participation in the 
judicial elections being analyzed.
The results of the coefficients revealed by the 
variable competitiveness contradicts Dubois’ <1980) 
contention that competition has no effect on voter turnout 
in nonpartisan judicial elections. The effects of 
competition on voter turnout in judicial elections may not 
be as great as its impact in congressional, presidential, or 
other elections. Despite this observation, it has been found 
to influence electoral participation in Louisiana’s 
nonpartisan contested judicial contests from 1981 through 
1988.
Type of Election
H 3: With all else being equal, electoral
participation will be greater in general 
elections.
H A : Ceteris paribus, electoral participation will 
decrease in primary elections.
Since this variable was scored "1" for general 
elections and "0" for primary elections, the negative
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magnitude of the regression coefficient indicates that voter 
turnout is insignificantly greater in primary judicial 
elections rather than general elections. The Pearson 
coefficient for this variable was -.110. The standardized 
regression coefficient for the variable type of election was 
-.060. The coefficients yielded by this variable add no 
explanatory power to the contextual model.
The negative direction of the coefficient supports the 
findings of Boyd (1989) and Wright (1989) instead of Key 
(1949). Key (1949) contended that voter turnout should be 
greater in general elections rather than primary elections 
in the South. Boyd (1989) and Wright (1989) concluded that 
voter turnout should be higher in primary elections rather 
than runoff primaries and general elections. In fact,
Dubois (1980, 40) concluded that "turnout decline in 
nonpartisan general elections."
Upon reflection, the performance of the variable type 
of election should have been expected. The reason being 
that given the election system of Louisiana, particularly in 
such races as gubernatorial, mayoral, and senatorial, voters 
are more likely to vote in primary elections with the hope 
that their preferred candidate receives the necessary 
majority in order to avoid a run-off election. In most 
cases, if a runoff election is necessary, electoral 
participation will decrease in the general election. In 
such instances, many voters make a rational choice not to
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participate in the runoff contest based on the belief that 
their votes will not affect the outcome of the general 
election.
For example, in most races Republican voters tend to 
vote in a bloc because this party is the minority political 
party in the State of Louisiana. This point may be 
exemplified even more by directing attention to 
gubernatorial races in Louisiana. The Republican Party 
usually nominates only one candidate, whereas the Democratic 
Party may nominate three or more candidates. As a result, 
the Republican Party as well as voters belonging to this 
party will attempt to win in the primary election in an 
attempt to avoid a runoff general election against a 
Democratic candidate.
Results of Candidate Model
This model of voter turnout contains components of the 
characteristics of judicial candidates participating in each 
election. The dimensions of the candidate model are as 
f o 1 lows :
TURNOUT = a + b' (campaign spending) + b® (prior 
elective experience) + b ’ (race of 
candidate) + b* (prior judicial 
exper i ence)
The variable race of candidates has been examined in 
existing studies of judicial elections (Collins 1980; Atkins 
et al. 1984; Alozie 1988). These scholars concluded in
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their respective works that the race of judicial candidates 
did increase voter turnout. An additional finding was that 
the electoral participation of lower income blacks increased 
at a higher rate than other blacks or similarly situated 
whites when black candidates participated in judicial 
contests.
The variables campaign spending and prior judicial 
experience have not been examined by judicial scholars to 
explain variations in voter turnout. The present study 
seeks to examine the influence these variables may have on 
voter turnout. The present study also seeks to determine 
whether the findings of congressional scholars (Erikson 
1971; Mayhew 1974; Abramowitz 1975; Cover 1977; Jacobson 
1981, 1987; Alford and Hibbing 1981, 1987; Bauer and Hibbing 
1989) may be generalized to explain variations in voter 
turnout in judicial elections on the basis of the campaign 
expenditure of candidates and incumbency. Finally, the
variable prior elective office has been included to
determine whether the previous occupation of judicial 
candidates, specifically those holding elective office, 
stimulate voter turnout. In short, those judicial 
candidates who have been successful in their bids for 
elective offices, excluding judgeships, in the past should
increase voter turnout and the saliency of judicial
elections in which their names appear on the ballot.
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The results of the candidate model are illustrated in 
Table Three. The candidate model of voter turnout explains 
11 percent of the variance in voter turnout in Louisiana 
trial and intermediate judicial elections from 1981 through 
1988.
Camoaion Spending
H 7: High levels of campaign spending will produce 
high levels of voter participation in 
judicial elections, ceteris paribus.
The variable campaign spending was found to have the 
greatest explanatory power in relation to the dependent 
variable voter turnout. The Pearson coefficient yielded by 
this variable is +.321, and the standardized regression 
coefficient is +.330. The magnitude of this variable did 
not decrease significantly when placed in the regression 
equation with the other independent variables. High levels 
of campaign spending are associated with high levels of 
voter turnout. In other words, judicial elections in which 
candidates spent more money on their campaigns were 
characterized by higher levels of voter turnout. To be more 
specific, for every thousand dollar a candidate spent on 
his/her campaign, voter turnout increased by +.087.
Prior Elective Office
H B: With all else being equal, the presence of a
candidate who has held prior elective office 
will be associated with high levels of voter 
turnout.
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The variable prior elective office added nothing to the 
explanatory power of the candidate model. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient for this variable is +.048, and the 
standardized regression coefficient is +.030. This variable 
had no impact on voter turnout in judicial elections.
The coefficients for this independent variable suggest 
that judicial candidates who had previously held some type 
of elective office did not increase voters’ interest in 
judicial elections nor encourage them to participate in 
these elections. Voters were no more likely to participate 
in judicial elections when candidates who had previously 
held elective office sought judgeships than they were in 
those elections involving candidates who had not previously 
held any type of elective office.
Race of Judicial Candidates
H ,: With all else being equal, the presence of a 
black judicial candidate on the ballot will 
increase black voter turnout and thus turnout 
overal1.
H itj The presence of a black candidate in a
judicial race, ceteris paribus, will increase 
white voter turnout and thus turnout overall.
A major issue involved in challenges to Louisiana 
electoral structure for electing judges is the existence of 
racial polarization in voting. According to Grofman (1989, 
1), "racially polarized voting exists where there is a 
consistent relationship between the race of the voter and
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Table Three
Pearson Correlation Coefficients and 
Standardized and Unstandardized Regression Coefficients
for Variables Included in Candidate Model
Variable
Pearson 
Correlation b Beta Sig. of T
Campaign Spending +.321** + .027 + .330 +.0004***
Prior Elective Office + .048 + .014 + .030 +.3755
Race of Candidate + .060 + .035 + .098 +.1509
Prior Judicial 
Experience
-.008 2.636
E-03
8.503
E-03
+.4645
R2 = +.11
***<.01, one-tail test 
**<.05, one-tail test 
*<.10, one-tail test
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the way in which the voters vote, i.e., where black voters 
and white voters vote differently."
Because of the presence of racial polarization in 
voting in those judicial elections in which black candidates 
compete against white candidates, voter turnout in such 
elections is expected to increase. According to existing 
research, (Collins 1980; Atkins et al. 1984; Alozie 1988), 
blacks are more likely to vote in judicial contests when a 
black candidate’s name is on the ballot. On the other hand, 
to off-set an increase in black electoral participation 
which result when black judicial candidates seek judgeships, 
white voters are expected to vote at higher levels. This 
phenomenon occurred during the 1984 and 1988 presidential 
campaigns in which Jesse Jackson sought the presidency. The 
same thing occurs in school board races, counci1 person 
elections, and in mayoral races when black candidates oppose 
white office-seekers.
Whereas the whites and blacks who decide to participate 
in judicial elections vote along racial lines, the variable 
race of judicial candidates was found to have no impact on 
increasing voter turnout. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient for this independent variable is +.060 and the 
Beta coefficient is +.098. In other words, racial 
polarization in voting may occur when black and white 
judicial candidates oppose each other, but this factor does 
not stimulate voters’ interest or motivate them to vote at
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
108
higher levels in such elections. This finding conflicts 
with the findings of existing studies (Collins 1980; Atkins 
et al. 1984; Alozie 1988) in which scholars have concluded 
that the presence of black judicial candidates on the ballot 
has a major impact on electoral participation.
Prior Judicial Experience
H,,; With all else being equal, an election
involving an incumbent or a candidate with 
prior judicial experience will stimulate 
voter turnout.
The variable prior judicial experience was found to be 
the least statistically significant independent variable 
contained in the candidate model. The Pearson coefficient 
for this variable is -.008 and the standardized regression 
coefficient is 8.504 (E-03). These coefficients suggest 
that voter turnout was increased slightly, but 
insignificantly, when newcomers or challengers competed 
rather than by the participation of incumbents. In fact, 
the presence of an incumbent in a judicial contest had no 
impact on voter turnout.
The expectation was that prior judicial experience 
would increase the name familiarity of judicial candidates, 
thus increasing voter turnout. Additionally, incumbents or 
candidates with prior judicial experience were expected to 
increase levels of voter participation because they attract 
greater amounts of campaign finances. For this reason it 
has been argued that incumbents are able to spend more on
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their campaigns which is likely to increase the saliency of 
the elections as well as voter turnout.
However, the variable did not perform as hypothesized. 
The actual performance of the independent variable prior 
judicial experience supports Dubois (1980) contention that 
name familiarity does not draw voters to the polls or 
increase voter turnout. Instead this factor has been found 
to influence vote choice or candidate preference. In fact, 
"the cue of incumbency may reveal itself to some voters only 
after they have stepped into the voting booth" (Dubois 1980, 
80) .
Results of Sociodemographic Model
The sociodemographic model contains variables 
representing select characteristics of the overall 
electorate within each judicial district being analyzed.
The variables included in this model are as follows:
TURNOUT = a + b ' (black median family income) + b® 
(percentage of white registered voters) 
+ b ^  (percent population residing in 
rural areas) + b (percentage of 
population 35-69 year old Cage]) + b “ 
(median family income) + b* (percent of 
voting age population that has a high 
school diploma) + b ’ (percent white- 
collar workers)
The above variables were selected for inclusion in this 
model because existing research has revealed a correlation 
between these variables and voter turnout (Collins 1980; 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Atkins et al. 1984). Whereas
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Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) focused their attentions on 
electoral participation in presidential elections, the 
present study like Collins (1980) and Atkins et al. (1984) 
examines the relationship between voter turnout and 
sociodemographic factors in state judicial elections.
Despite this fact, the present study differs from the works 
of Collins (1980) and Atkins et al. (1984), since they 
focused only on black voter turnout instead of overall 
electoral participation in judicial elections.
The inclusion of sociodemographic variables will allow 
a determination as to whether the demographic factors that 
influence electoral participation in presidential elections 
are typical or atypical of the forces that impact on voter 
turnout in state judicial elections. The results of the 
sociodemographic model are illustrated in Table Four. This 
model explains 16 percent of the variance in voter turnout 
in Louisiana nonpartisan contested judicial elections held 
from 1981 through 1988.
H ij? With all else being equal, elections held in 
districts with voters of high levels of 
educational attainment should be 
characterized by high levels of voter 
turnout.
The variable percent high school graduates was found to 
have an effect on voter turnout in judicial elections. Even 
though the negative direction of the coefficients yielded by 
this variable differ from the positive coefficients revealed 
in the work of Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) in their
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Table Four
Pearson Correlation Coefficients and 
Standardized and Unstandardized Regression Coefficients 
for Variables Included in Sociodemographic Model
Variable
Pearson
Correlation b Beta Sig. of T
Black Median Income -. 199 4.659
E-06
+ . 133 +.2161
White Registered 
Voters -.065 -.132 -.114 +.1569
Rural +.270* +. 088 + .154 +.2316
Age — . 048 -.191 -.071 +.2246
White-Collar Workers -.254 +. 444 + .207 +.1676
Median Income -.243 4.199 -.155 +.1259 
E—06
Percent of High 
School Graduates
-.349** -.847 -.438 +.0155*
R2 = +.16
***<.01, one-tail test 
**<.05, one-tail test 
*<.10, one-tail test
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analysis of presidential elections, the premise remains the 
same. According to Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), 
education was found to be the most significant demographic 
variable in explaining voter turnout in presidential 
elections. This finding also holds true in state judicial 
elections, specifically Louisiana judicial elections.
The educational attainment of the electorate was found 
to have an impact on voter turnout. In the present study, 
judicial elections held in districts consisting of less 
educated voters were characterized by higher levels of voter 
turnout than those elections held in districts with voters 
of higher levels of educational attainment. An explanation 
which may explain the unpredicted performance of this 
variable is that most voters do not perceive judges as 
policymakers (Vines and Jacob 1971; Miller 1978; Haydel 
1989). Whereas voters with high levels of education were 
more likely to participate in presidential elections 
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), the same is not true in 
state judicial elections. A plausible explanation for this 
is that these voters are likely to have higher incomes and 
are motivated to vote in presidential races in order to 
protect or ensure their economic or self-interest (Frey 
1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Congress as well as 
the President are involved in deciding the budget, whether 
taxes will be increased, and the overall economic well-being 
of the nation. On the other hand, state judges are not
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viewed nor are they active participants in determining 
economic matters. For this reason, judicial elections held 
in districts with voters of high levels of education were 
not found to have high levels of electoral participation.
In other words, the political stakes for educated 
voters may differ in state trial and appellate court 
elections as opposed to presidential general elections.
Downs (1957) rational actor model may explain the behavior 
of voters with high levels of educational attainment in 
judicial elections. These voters may make a rational choice 
not to participate in these elections because they perceive 
themselves as receiving less benefits from successful 
judicial candidates. Similarly, the more educated voters may 
undergo a cost-benefit analysis (Riker and Oidershook 1968) 
in which they perceive the cost (e.g., time required to vote 
and to inform themselves about the candidates) of partici­
pating in judicial elections as exceeding the benefits they 
will receive if a particular candidate wins.
This finding differ from Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s 
(1980) findings in their examination of voter turnout in 
presidential contests. These scholars found a positive 
correlation between high educational attainment and the 
probability of voting.
The work of Patterson and Caldeira (1983) in which they 
focused on voter turnout in gubernatorial elections supports 
the above statements. The results of the socioeconomic and
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general models in their study suggested that education does 
not explain variations in electoral participation to the 
same degree in other elections as it did in the presidential 
general elections examined by Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
< 1980) .
Additionally, because individuals with less education 
are more likely to come in contact with members of the 
judiciary than persons who are better educated (Hindelang 
1983; U.S. Department of Justice 1983, 1987; Flowers 1989), 
the former may view the election of judges as a personal 
stake for them. Whereas those with higher educational 
attainment are more likely to participate in presidential 
and congressional contests because they perceive themselves 
as having personal stakes in the electoral success of 
particular candidates, this may well be the case in judicial 
races for the less educated. For example, if one were to 
visit any city or district court in Louisiana or any other 
state, most of the individuals with cases, whether they are 
misdemeanors or felonies, pending in these courts are "more 
likely to be poor, uneducated, male, unemployed, and black" 
(Flowers 1989). For this reason, judicial elections may be 
more salient to the less educated and their families than to 
voters with higher levels of educational attainment.
As a result of the following explanation, less educated 
voters may perceive themselves as having personal stakes in 
the election of particular judges. These voters may perform
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a cost-benefit analysis (Riker and Oidershook 1968) which 
encourage them to vote, since they perceive the outcome of 
judicial elections as having an impact on their or their
family members daily lives. For example, these voters may
believe it is in their best interest to aid in the selection 
of a judge who is known for his/her fairness when reaching 
decisions or a judge who does not impose harsh sentences for 
minor infractions. Therefore, like voters with high levels 
of educational attainment, voters with less educate make a 
rational choice to participate in state judicial elections. 
The political stakes for the latter voters may be argued to 
be higher in state trial and appellate court elections 
rather than presidential general elections.
H,:# With all else being equal, elections held in 
districts with voters of high incomes are
expected to have high levels of voter 
turnout.
The variable included in the sociodemographic model to 
test this hypothesis is median family income. This variable 
was found to have no impact on the dependent variable voter 
turnout. This finding is contrary to that of Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone (1980). These scholars concluded that voter 
turnout in presidential elections increased with income. On 
the other hand, the results of the present study suggest 
that judicial elections held in districts consisting of low 
income voters were associated with higher levels of turnout
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than those elections held in districts consisting of voters 
with high incomes.
The rationale for the above finding is that people with 
lower levels of income are more likely than those with 
higher levels of income to come in contact with members of 
the judiciary (Hindelang 1983; U.S. Department of Justice 
1983, 1987; Flowers 1989), therefore the former voters are 
more likely to participate in judicial races. Whereas 
judicial races may lack saliency for voters with higher 
incomes, such races may be salient for lower income voters 
who are more likely to know the names of lawyers who 
subsequently become judicial candidates within their 
districts.
An additional explanation which may be provided to 
explain the performance of the variable income is Kenney’s 
(1983, 322) findings that "Southern states (Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi) have high turnout rates and 
extremely low per capita income figures." In his analysis 
of gubernatorial primaries in the United States, the author 
found a negative statistically significant relationship 
between income and turnout.
Hi,; With all else being equal, elections held in
districts consisting of white-collar workers 
should be characterized by high levels of 
electoral participation.
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) in their analysis of
the impact the occupational level of the electorate may have
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on voter turnout in presidential elections found that 
increased job status increased the probability of voting. 
These scholars concluded that increased job status or being 
a white-collar worker increased the likelihood of voting.
However, the relationship between occupational level 
and the likelihood of voting was not found to be significant 
in this analysis of voter turnout in judicial elections. 
Despite the magnitude of the standardized coefficient for 
this variable, the significance test (+.3352) indicates that 
the variable white-collar workers did not significantly 
correlate with the dependent variable— voter turnout.
H Elections held in districts with large
percentages of white registered voters are 
expected to have high levels of voter 
turnout, ceteris paribus.
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) concluded that whites 
were more likely to vote than blacks in presidential general 
elections. The only exception these scholars found was that 
voter turnout among lower income and less educated blacks 
exceeded that of similarly situated whites. Whites in 
general were more likely to vote than blacks.
The coefficients yielded for the variable white 
registered voter percent was found to have no impact on 
voter turnout in the state trial and intermediate court 
elections examined in this study. Judicial elections held 
in districts with larger percentages of white voters were 
not found to have higher levels of voter turnout than those
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elections held in districts with larger percentages of black 
voters.
The explanatory power of the variable white registered 
voter percent may be attributed to the low visibility of 
judicial races as opposed to presidential elections.
H,*: With all else being equal, elections held in
districts consisting of low income black 
voters are expected to be characterized by 
high levels of voter participation.
The variable black median family income was chosen for 
inclusion in the sociodemographic model to measure the 
relationship between lower income blacks and electoral 
participation in state judicial elections. Shingles (1981) 
and Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) concluded that lower 
class blacks were more likely to vote than similarly 
situated whites in presidential general elections.
The coefficients revealed for this variable support the 
contentions of Verba and Nie (1972) and Abramson and 
Claggett (1989) that there is no significant difference in 
black-white electoral participation. According to Verba and 
Nie (1972) this is especially true when such factors as 
education, income, and occupational levels are controlled 
for .
H Ceteris paribus, elections held in districts 
with voters ranging in age from 35 to 69 are 
expected to have high levels of voter 
turnout.
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According to Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), age was 
the second most important variable in explaining voter 
turnout in presidential elections. Despite the findings of 
these scholars, the variable age was found to have no impact 
on voter turnout in state judicial elections.
H With all else being equal, elections held in 
districts located in rural areas should be 
characterized by high levels of electoral 
participation.
The coefficients for the variable rural indicate that 
elections held in rural areas did not have higher levels of 
electoral participation than those held in urban areas.
This finding contradicts the works of Key (1949), Campbell 
et al. (1960), and Blank (1974) in which they concluded that 
voter turnout was greater in rural areas rather than urban 
areas.
Results of General Model
Since the three separate models which have been devised 
do not provide adequate explanations for the relationship 
between select factors and electoral participation in state 
judicial elections, a general model which integrates the 
components of these three models has been devised. The 
contextual model explained 33 percent, the candidate model 
11 percent, and the sociodemographic model explained 16 
percent of the variance in electoral participation in state 
judicial elections. The general model consists of all of 
the variables contained in the simple models— candidate,
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contextual, and sociodemographic factors. This model 
explains 57 percent of the variance in electoral 
participation in state trial and intermediate court 
elections. The general model of voter turnout is as 
fo1 lows :
TURNOUT = candidate model (race, campaign spending, 
prior judicial experience, prior elective 
office) + contextual model (presidential 
election, congressional election, high 
visibility election, type of election, 
competitiveness) + sociodemographic model 
(median family income, age, percent rural, 
white-collar workers, black median income, 
education, white registered voters)
The explanatory power of the general model of voter 
turnout is much more powerful than the individual models.
The explanatory power of the general model indicates that a 
combination of factors influence voter turnout in judicial 
elections. This analysis demonstrates that taken 
separately, the dimensions of candidate attributes, the 
context of the electoral environment, nor the sociodemo­
graphic characteristics of the electorate can sufficiently 
explain variations in voter turnout in these elections. The 
coefficients yielded by this model are depicted in Table 
Five. The results of the general model are significant, 
since they clearly indicate that a reliance or emphasis on 
one set of dimensions will dramatically limit the 
predictability of electoral participation in state judicial 
elect ions.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
121
Table Five
Pearson Correlation Coefficients and 
Standardized and Unstandardized Regression Coefficients 
for Variables Included in General Model
Pearson
Variable Correlation b Beta Sig. of T
High Visibility 
Percent of High
+.352** + . 179 + .487 + .0000***
School Graduates -.349 -.377 -.194 +.1139
Congressional Election +.327** + . 132 + .411 +.0000***
Campaign Spending +.321** + .024 + .290 +.0001***
Compet i t i on -.231 -1.035 
E-04
-. 121 +.0718*
Rural Percent + .269 + .158 + .277 +.0544*
Prior Judicial Office — . 008 -.045 -.146 +.0551 *
White-collar Workers -.254 + .288 + .134 +.2226
Race of Candidate +. 060 + .044 + .124 +.0802*
Median Family Income -.243 -3.952
E-06
-.146 +. 0863*
Presidential Election + .005 — . 080 -.120 +.0650*
Prior Elective Office + .048 + .052 + .112 +.0725*
Type of Election -.110 -.030 — . 080 +.1454
Age -.048 -.032 + .032 +.3328
Black Median Income -.199 -3.976
E-06
+ .114 +.2019
White Registered Voters 
Rz = +.57
-.065 — . 063 +. 055 +.2893
***<.01, one-tail test 
**<.05, one-tail test 
*<.10, one-tail test
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The main contribution of the general model to judicial 
election research is that it demonstrates; (1) election 
scheduling is the most important factor when explaining 
differences in levels of voter turnout in judicial 
elections, (2) the campaign spending of judicial candidates 
provides the second best explanation, and (3) the 
sociodemographic variables found to be significant were 
rural percent and median family income. Voters were more 
likely to participate in judicial elections which were held 
concurrently with high visibility elections (e.g., 
gubernatorial and mayoral races) and those held 
simultaneously with congressional contests. To a lesser 
degree the independent variables competition and pres­
idential election were found to increase electoral 
participation when all other variables are controlled for. 
Elections in which judicial candidates spent more on their 
campaigns had higher levels of voter turnout. Other 
noteworthy findings involving the candidate variables were 
the performance of the independent variables prior judicial 
office, race of candidates, and prior elective office.
Those elections involving judicial candidates who had 
previously held judicial office or some type of elective 
office had higher levels of voter turnout. Additionally, 
judicial races in which black candidates opposed white 
candidates had higher levels of electoral participation.
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As hypothesized elections held in rural areas and those 
in which voters had high median family income had higher 
levels of electoral participation than contests held in 
urban areas and in districts containing voters with low 
median family income.
A noteworthy finding which was revealed when the 
variables scholars (Hannah 1972; Adamany and Dubois 1976; 
Dubois 1979, 1980) have considered in their research were 
controlled for was the explanatory power of the variables 
relied upon to measure the impact of election scheduling. 
These scholars concluded in their respective works that 
voter turnout in state supreme court elections was greatest 
in those elections held concurrently with presidential 
elections, followed by increased electoral participation in 
judicial elections held concurrently with congressional 
races. They also stated that voter turnout should decrease 
dramatically or be the least in off-year elections. The 
results of the present analysis indicate that voter turnout 
was greatest in high visibility (e.g., gubernatorial and 
mayoral) and congressional elections, followed by increased 
turnout in those judicial races held concurrently with 
presidential races.
These researchers accounted for differences in voter 
turnout when explaining the impact of the variable election 
scheduling by focusing on the concept of "rolloff." Rolloff 
occurs when voters cast ballots for salient offices at the
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top of the ballot but fail to participate in elections at 
the bottom of the ballot (Dubois 1980).
Despite the findings of these scholars, the results of 
the present study indicate that voter turnout was greatest 
in nonpartisan judicial elections held during off-year or 
high visibility elections (e.g., gubernatorial and mayoral 
races) and in concurrent congressional elections. This 
finding may require a re-examination of the concept 
"rolloff." Rolloff has customarily been attributed to the 
saliency of offices at the top of the ballot (Hannah 1972; 
Adamany and Dubois 1976; Dubois 1980) or voter fatigue 
(Walker 1966; Wright 1989) when faced with a lengthy ballot. 
Most would argue that the performance of the variable 
presidential election in the present research is 
predictability, since the units of analysis are nonpartisan 
judicial elections. However, both presidential and 
congressional races (U.S. senatorial) are partisan events in 
which political parties play major roles. In spite of this, 
the present study found that judicial races held 
concurrently with congressional races had less rolloff than 
presidential races, since voter turnout in judicial 
elections held concurrently with congressional, elections was 
higher. Surely, there must be another explanation to 
explain this finding rather than relying upon the 
differences between nonpartisan and partisan elections.
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Additionally» state political party organizations play major 
roles in gubernatorial elections.
The present study suggests that rolloff may also be the 
result of voters’ perceiving a difference between ballots 
containing national elections and those containing state and 
local races. In other words, another possible explanation 
for rolloff is the willingness of voters to participate in 
national elections and not state or local elections. Voters 
may view the officeholders in Washington, D.C. as 
representing a different form of politics than state and 
local officials. Even though U.S. congresspersons occupy 
offices in Washington, D.C., they are still perceived by the 
voters to be state officeholders.
Another explanation may be Boyd’s (1989) ballot 
attractiveness hypothesis in which he contended that it is 
local statewide contests such as gubernatorial races which 
increased voter turnout in presidential races. According to 
Boyd (1989, 739), "gubernatorial races on a presidential 
year ballot increase voting rates by six percentage points, 
drawing people to the polls who would not otherwise vote in 
presidential elections."
Boyd argued that it is the saliency of local and 
statewide races which bring voters to the polls. Although 
Boyd’s findings differ somewhat from the conclusions of the 
present analysis, his findings are relevant because he 
distinguishes between the saliency of national, state, and
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local contests when examining rolloff. Boyd’s conclusions 
suggest that voters do in fact differentiate between 
national and state or local electoral contests which in turn 
increases or depresses electoral participation.
The findings of congressional scholars (Erikson 1971; 
Mayhew 1974; Cover 1977; Parker and Parker 1980; Collie 
1981; Garand and Gross 1984; Bauer and Nibbing 1989) on 
incumbency advantage can, to a certain extent, be 
generalized when analyzing judicial incumbents. These 
scholars concluded that congressional incumbents have an 
information advantage as well as an advantage when raising 
and attracting campaign resources. The findings of the 
present study contradict the recent findings of Jacobson 
(1987) in his examination of congressional incumbency 
advantage.
Jacobson (1987) found evidence which suggest that 
congressional races involving incumbents were no less 
competitive than those which did not involve incumbents. He 
found that contests involving incumbent House members were 
still competitive and that their margin of victory as well 
as their success in their bids for reelection have declined 
in subsequent elections. Despite Jacobson’s contentions, 
the presence of an incumbent in a judicial contest did have 
an impact on voter turnout.
The variable campaign spending performed as expected. 
Relying upon the findings of congressional and gubernatorial
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scholars (Heard I960; Adamany 1972; Owens 1973; Jacobson 
1980; Caldeira and Patterson 1983; Patterson and Caldeira 
1983) in their analyses of the impact campaign spending may 
have on voter turnout as a foundation for the hypothesis in 
the present study reveal that campaign spending also has an 
impact on electoral participation in judicial elections. 
Therefore, based upon findings in the present study as well 
as existing literature on other elections, campaign spending 
may be said to influence voter participation.
The only sociodemographic variables which performed as 
hypothesized when placed in the general model were median 
family income and rural percent. Like Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone (1980), the results of the present research 
suggest that electoral participation increases with income. 
Judicial elections held in districts consisting of voters 
with high median family income were characterized with 
higher levels of voter turnout.
Like Key (1949), Campbell et al. (1960), and Blank 
(1974), this examination of voter turnout reveals that 
turnout is greater in those elections held in rural areas as 
opposed to those held in urban areas. The nature of 
politics in rural areas— being more personal— and the 
presence of "Big Government" in urban areas may account for 
this observed difference in electoral participation.
There are several reasons for the performance of the 
other sociodemographic variables included in this analysis
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as opposed to their performance in the work of Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone (1980). First of all, the present study differs 
from Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s (1980) work, since these 
scholars employed self-validated reports of voting in their 
analysis of voter turnout in presidential general elections. 
This analysis measures voter turnout by relying on the 
actual votes cast in judicial elections. The Bureau of 
Census' operationalization of specific variables were relied 
upon and the turnout percents were calculated instead of 
employing turnout reports provided by the U.S. Census 
Bureau. Researchers have challenged the validity of using 
self-validated reports of voting (Hill 1984; Anderson and 
Silver 1986; Silver et al. 1986; and Abramson and Claggett 
1989). However, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) contended 
that their reports on voter turnout were not distorted by 
"misreporting" of voting by the respondents surveyed. They 
cited the works of Traugott and Katosh (1979) and Weisberg
(1979) on vote validation to support this contention.
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) did acknowledge 
differences in vote percentages revealed by relying upon 
survey data as opposed to measuring turnout as a proportion 
of the total votes cast by the total voting age population. 
According to these scholars (1980, 115),
estimates of turnout in sample surveys 
are always somewhat higher than those 
based on the total number of ballots 
cast by the aggregate voting-age 
population. Since 1948, reported
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turnout in sample surveys has ranged 
between 5 percent and 17 percent higher 
than the aggregate estimates.... The 
1972 election is no exception.... The 
commonly cited aggregate turnout figure 
is 55.5 percent while reported turnout 
from our Current Population Survey 
sample is 66.7 percent, a gap of 11.2 
percent.
Wolfinger and Rosenstone <1980, 115) argued that 
measuring turnout as a proportion of the total voting age 
population casting valid ballots results in an underestima­
tion of voting due to the fact that the total voting age 
population "includes millions of people who are ineligible 
to vote: aliens, inmates of prisons and mental
institutions, and ex-convicts who cannot vote in many 
states." Despite this observation, extrapolating total 
voting age population over a period of time eliminates some 
of these problems. For example, aliens, prisoners, and 
those confined to mental institutions do not complete census 
information forms. Therefore, institutionalized individuals 
are removed from the total voting age population over time. 
Furthermore, since the Census of Population contains a 
category listing the number of persons confined to prisons 
and mental institutions, researchers are able to eliminate 
these persons from the total voting age population before 
calculating turnout percents.
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 116) also stated that 
"if noncitizens are removed from the denominator (total 
voting age population) of the aggregate computation, the
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turnout estimate rises from 55.5 percent to 56.7 percent." 
This difference is not as significant as the difference 
which result when sample surveys are employed to report 
turnout. Based upon Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s 
observations, the conclusions presented in this analysis, 
and the works of Anderson and Silver (1986) and Silver et 
al. (1986); overreporting the estimates of turnout with the 
use of sample data presents more of a problem than calculat­
ing turnout as a proportion of the total voting age popula­
tion casting valid ballots. According to Silver et al. 
(1986), because groups with certain demographic traits are 
more likely to overreport voting, research utilizing 
individual level data or surveys is more likely to be 
contaminated by individual motivational biases. For 
example. Silver et al. (1986, 623) found that "more highly- 
educated respondents are more likely than less-educated 
respondents to try to appear to be in conformity with the 
regime norm of voting, even when their actual behavior is 
inconsistent with this norm." This observation may provide 
one explanation for the performance of the variable 
education in Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s (1980) work. These 
researchers found education to be the most important 
variable in predicting voter turnout. Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone concluded that individuals with higher levels of 
educational attainment were more likely to vote than those 
with less educational attainment.
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Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) also argued that 
computations of voter turnout results in underestimation, 
since only valid votes are counted. According to these 
researchers (1980, 116), "the numerator of the aggregate 
percentage represents the total number of valid counted 
votes for president. This excludes people who cast a 
spoiled ballot (they think they vote, but their vote is not 
counted), those who go to the polls but do not vote for 
president, and people whose votes for miscellaneous write-in 
candidates are not tallied." Contrary to this argument, 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 6) excluded from their 
analysis "all cases where the respondent did not know if a
vote had been cast or where this information was not 
ascertained by the interviewer." These scholars followed, 
to a certain degree, the measurement technique they 
criticized in the aggregate measure of voter turnout.
Another explanation which may explain the differences 
revealed by the sociodemographic variables operationalized 
in the present study and those included in Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone’s (1980) work is the level of analysis. The 
present study employs the systemic or aggregate level of 
analysis whereas Wolfinger and Rosenstone employed the 
individual level of analysis by relying on survey data. In
his discussion of the ecological fallacy, Robinson (1950) 
demonstrated that there are differences between findings
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obtain with the use of aggregate data and those obtained 
using individual data.
Third, Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s (1980) discussion of 
the impact of age on electoral participation was not 
comprehensive enough. These scholars did not take into 
consideration the fact that eighteen-year-olds were not 
allowed to vote until 1971 with the ratification of the 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Arterton (1974) demonstrated that 
major political events (e.g.-, war, economic depression, or 
political corruption) have tremendous impacts on political 
socialization as well as levels of political participation. 
According to this scholar, the generational effect— when 
events of a particular era have an enduring effect on 
political opinions, preferences, and participation— did have 
an impact on the Vietnam generation. As a result, these 
individuals were found to have less patriotic views than 
those older than their group (Arterton 1974, 269).
Wolfinger and Rosenstone did not discuss the impact the 
Vietnam War or the generational effect may have had on 
depressing voter turnout among those between the ages of 18 
and 25 in the 1972 presidential general elections. These 
individuals were more likely to be drafted to fight in the 
war than older Americans. Furthermore, the late 1960s and 
early 1970s were characterized by many protests or 
demonstrations. As a result, there was a large segment of 
American society which was apolitical.
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Fourth, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1970 
to remove barriers to voting for blacks (e.g, literacy 
tests). It may be argued that some black respondents in 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone's (1980) research either under­
reported voting because of a fear and mistrust of the 
intentions of the interviewers or overreported as a way to 
demonstrate they were carrying out their civic duty and 
deserved the right to vote.
Summary
Most of the variables which indicated a strong 
correlation with voter turnout when regressed in the simple 
models performed in similar manners when placed in the 
general model of voter turnout in judicial elections. In 
fact, the statistical significance of these variables 
improved when placed in the overall regression equation.
Of the three independent models, the strongest 
relationship (R2 = +.33) was revealed by the contextual 
model. The two variables yielding the most statistically 
significant coefficients in this model were high visibility 
election and congressional election. These two variables 
were also found to be significant in the general model. 
Judicial elections scheduled concurrently with high 
visibility elections (mayoral or gubernatorial) or 
congressional elections had the highest levels of electoral 
participation. The performance of these variables supports 
Blank (1974) contention that election structure or
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contextual factors are the most important factors in 
explaining variations in electoral participation. 
Additionally, the explanatory powers of the variables 
presidential election and competition were not as powerful 
as the independent variables high visibility and 
congressional elections, however, judicial elections held 
concurrently with presidential races and those which were 
competitive did have increased levels of voter turnout.
Even though the relationship (R2 = +.16) revealed by 
the candidate model was not as powerful as that explained by 
the contextual model <R2 = +.33), the variable campaign 
spending was found to be a factor in influencing voter 
turnout in this model. The coefficient for this variable in 
the general model suggests that greater campaign spending on 
the part of judicial candidates increase voter turnout in 
judicial races. This variable remained significant in 
explaining variations in voter turnout even when placed in 
the general model. The independent variables prior judicial 
office, race of candidate, and prior elective office were 
also found to influence voter turnout in Louisiana 
nonpartisan contested judicial elections. Even though the 
impact of these variables is considerably less than that of 
the variable campaign spending, their contribution to the 
general model should not be ignored.
The only sociodemographic variables which explained 
differences in electoral participation were rural percent
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and median family income. Judicial elections held in rural 
areas had higher levels of voter turnout than those held in 
urban areas. Likewise, elections held in districts 
consisting of large percentages of voters with high median 
family income were characterized by high levels of voter 
turnout.
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Conclusions
The present study attempts to answer two main questions 
which have not been examined by judicial scholars. The 
results revealed by the general model of voter turnout have 
been analyzed to answer these questions. The first question 
is: What is the precise relationship between incumbency or
prior judicial experience, campaign spending, and the race 
of judicial candidates and variations in electoral 
participation when other factors are controlled for? The 
second question is: Is the electorate that participates in
judicial elections typical or atypical of the electorate 
that participates in presidential contests in terms of their 
demographic characteristics?
The results of this research suggest that all three of 
these variables influenced electoral participation in 
Louisiana judicial elections. The results of the present 
analysis indicate that of the three variables of interest, 
campaign spending yielded the strongest correlation with 
voter turnout in judicial elections. The race of judicial 
candidates as well as incumbency or prior judicial 
experience had less of an impact on electoral participation.
The variable campaign spending was found to encourage 
voter participation. As a result of the low visibility of 
judicial elections, particularly nonpartisan elections, when
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compared to other elections (e.g, presidential, U.S. 
senatorial, gubernatorial, or mayoral), judicial elections 
with high levels of candidate expenditure were expected to 
have high levels of electoral participation. For this 
reason, a significant positive relationship was expected and 
revealed between campaign spending and electoral 
participation in judicial elections.
Whereas scholars have found evidence which suggest the 
existence of racial polarization in voting in Louisiana 
nonpartisan judicial elections (Weber 1988, 1989; Engstrom 
1988), the present study demonstrates that the race of 
judicial candidates also affects voting behavioi participa­
tion. The race of these candidates may have an impact on 
the preference of voters who decide to participate in 
judicial elections as well as increase the saliency of these 
contests or electoral participation.
Obviously, voters know enough about the judicial 
candidates to vote along racial lines. Knowledge of the 
race of these candidates serve as a voting cue and a voting 
st imulus.
Finally, incumbency advantage was found to influence 
voter participation in judicial races. Just as congres­
sional incumbents have been found to draw voters to the 
polls as a result of their name familiarity among voters and 
their ability to raise large sums of campaign expenditures 
(Heard 1960; Mayhew 1974; Cover 1977; Jacobson 1980), the
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same is true of judicial incumbents. It remains to be 
determined whether voters are more likely to vote for 
judicial incumbents rather than challengers.
The second question involves determining whether the 
characteristics of voters who participate in presidential 
elections are similar or different from the characteristics 
of the electorate that participates in judicial elections. 
Scholars who have explained variations in voter turnout on 
the basis of the sociodemographic characteristics of the 
electorate have concluded that the variable education should 
have the strongest relationship with turnout in presidential 
general elections (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). The 
demographic variable found to be the second most important 
according to these researchers was income.
The results of the present analysis suggest that 
education was not important. However, Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone (1980) found higher levels of education to 
increase the probability of voting. The findings of this 
study suggest that judicial elections held in districts 
consisting of less educated voters revealed slightly higher 
levels of electoral participation than those held in 
districts consisting of voters with high levels of 
educational attainment. Also elections held in districts 
with large percentages of white voters, lower income blacks, 
those between the age of 35 and 69, large percentages of
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white-collar workers were not found to be characterized by 
higher levels of voter turnout.
The variable percentage of the total voting age 
population residing in rural area has been included in this 
analysis because the results of existing studies (Key 1949; 
Campbell et al. I960; Blank 1974) suggested a correlation 
between rural areas and voter turnout. The results of this 
analysis indicate that elections held in rural areas had 
significantly higher levels of voter participation than 
those occurring in urban areas.
The variable median family income was found to increase 
electoral participation. However, the explanatory power of 
this variable with relations to the dependent variable voter 
turnout was not as significant in judicial races as it was 
found to be in presidential general elections (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980).
The above findings or the relationship between the 
sociodemographic variables and electoral participation 
suggest that sociodemographics cannot be relied upon to the 
same degree when explaining changes in voter turnout in 
judicial elections as they are in presidential elections. 
Despite Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) reliance on survey 
or individual level data, the above observations lead one to 
conclude that the electorate that participates in judicial 
elections may be somewhat atypical of the electorate that 
participates in presidential elections. The fact that
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electoral participation was higher in judicial races held 
concurrently with congressional and local and statewide high 
visibility races (e.g., gubernatorial and mayoral) rather 
than in judicial contests held concurrently with 
presidential general elections support the previous 
statement.
Southwell (1988) concluded in her analysis of 
congressional elections that Rosenstone’s (1982) 
"mobilization" hypothesis explains variations in who 
actually participates in different elections. Rosenstone’s 
(1982, 26) "mobilization" hypothesis is based upon the 
assumption that "certain voters are mobilized or encouraged 
to vote as a result of the contextual environment present 
during an election." According to Southwell (1988, 285), 
"group differences in voter turnout are susceptible to 
change. It appears unlikely that future researchers will be 
able to predict the turnout levels of blacks, working class 
individuals, and the unemployed without a full understanding 
of the immediate situation." The "situation" the author is 
referring to is the economic and political environment 
prevalent during particularly elections.
The previous paragraph supports the finding revealed by 
the results of the general model in the present study. 
Contextual factors had greater explanatory powers than any 
of the other independent variables. Other factors, 
specifically the personal characteristics of the judicial
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candidates and of the electorate did not explain variations 
in voter turnout in the judicial elections to the same 
degree as the contextual variables. The only exception 
being campaign spending.
Implications for Future Research
The present research represents an attempt to provide a 
comprehensive model containing characteristics which may 
affect electoral participation in judicial elections. 
Research has been conducted to explain differences in voter 
turnout in presidential (Verba and Nie 1972; Ashenfelter and 
Kelley 1975; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Conway 1981; 
Shaffer 1981), congressional (Silberman and Durden 1975; 
Dawson and Zinser 1976; Caldeira and Patterson 1982), and 
gubernatorial (Jewell and Olson 1982; Patterson and Caldeira 
1983) elections. However, the same scholarly attention has 
not been devoted to explaining variations in electoral 
participation in judicial elections.
Hannah (1972), Adamany and Dubois (1976), and Dubois
(1980) did focus on voter turnout but none of these scholars 
devised a comprehensive model to explain the impact certain 
factors may have on voter turnout in judicial elections. As 
a result, judicial election research lacks an empirical 
basis. Whereas a theoretical framework has been established 
by these scholars, empirical testing of these theories has 
not been conducted.
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The present study represents the author’s attempt to 
fill this void. It is the hope that.future research efforts 
will focus on constructing sound empirical models to explain 
differences in voter turnout in judicial elections. 
Considerable knowledge has been devoted to presidential and 
congressional election studies. Researchers have developed 
a body of knowledge, both theoretically and empirically 
based, to explain voter turnout in such elections. The same 
attention needs to be given to examining factors which 
encourage or depress electoral participation in judicial 
elections.
Not only should future research focus on factors which 
stimulate or depress voter turnout in judicial elections, 
scholars should examine vote choice in these elections.
Even though scholars have found evidence which suggest that 
black voters are more likely to vote for black judicial 
candidates (Sheffield and Hadley 1984; Lovrich and Sheldon 
1988; Weber 1988, 1989; Engstrom 1988) and white voters for 
white judicial candidates (Weber 1988, 1989; Engstrom 1988), 
the only study which has been conducted to explain vote 
choice in nonpartisan judicial elections is Dubois (1984).
As a result, Dubois (1984, 395) stated that "the subfield of 
judicial politics still lacks a precise understanding of 
determinants of voter choice in low salience nonpartisan 
judicial elections."
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Future research efforts should also be devoted to 
determining whether voters do not participate in state and 
local elections placed on the ballot with a national race 
because they perceive the ballot as consisting of two 
distinct ballots— one, national and the other, state or 
local. Some distinction on the part of the electorate is 
evident, since voters were more likely to participate in 
judicial elections held concurrently with state (congres­
sional and gubernatorial) and local (mayoral) races rather 
than those held during presidential elections. It remains 
to be determined whether there is an across the board 
decline in electoral participation in state and local races 
held concurrently with presidential elections as opposed to 
those held during local, U.S. senatorial, and other 
statewide elections.
Finally, whereas judicial scholars have analyzed the 
voting behavior or decision-making patterns of Justices of 
the United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals (Nagel 
1962; Woodford 1977; Goldman and Sarat 1978; Miller 1978; 
Spaeth 1979; Tate 1981), they have not devoted the same 
attention to the behavior of judges involved in deciding the 
merits of lawsuits challenging judicial election structures. 
One question which should be considered is: Why are there
differences in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ interpretation 
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 
1982? Is this difference in interpretation the result of
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the Circuits’ response to public opinion, the composition of 
the courts, the personal attributes of the judges, or the 
result of judges relying on voting cues? Each of these 
factors have been examined by scholars who have analyzed the 
decision-making of U.S. Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 
judges.
Another important question which has not been raised 
is: Is it a conflict of interest for members of the
judiciary to decide matters which may affect them as well as 
their colleagues? In terms of the separation of powers and 
checks and balances, should decisions involving judicial 
election processes be left in the hands of judges? For 
example, judicial elections held in the Fifth Circuit have 
been included in analyses by researchers to determine 
whether those elections dilute the voting strength of 
minorities (Weber 1988; Engstrom 1988). Could challenges to 
the judicial elections held in the Fifth Circuit account for 
differences in the Fifth and Sixth Circuit judges’ 
interpretations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, as amended 1982, as well as an avoidance on the part 
of the Fifth Circuit to address the issue of minority vote 
dilution? Is there an alternative rather than allowing 
judges to decide the future of judicial election structures 
or processes?
Even though the previously posed questions have not 
been analyzed by judicial scholars, the present analysis
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does provide notable implications for future research.
A noteworthy finding is the relationship between the 
scheduling of judicial elections and voter turnout. The 
present research reveals that judicial elections held 
concurrently with high visibility elections (gubernatorial 
or mayoral) and congressional elections (U.S. senatorial) 
had higher levels of voter turnout than those held 
simultaneously with presidential general elections. Despite 
this finding the variable presidential election did increase 
electoral participation in Louisiana judicial elections. An 
additional factor was the independent variable competition. 
More competitive judicial contests were characterized by 
higher levels of electoral participation.
The policy implication of this finding is that the 
scheduling or political context in which judicial elections 
or elections in general occur does affect levels of voter 
turnout in such elections. Researchers have examined the 
problems associated with low voter turnout in American 
elections (Pateman 1970; Burnham 1982, 1987; Nagel 1987;
Held 1987). According to these scholars, low voter turnout 
is contrary to American democratic principles. Despite 
their concern with low voter turnout and the factors which 
affect turnout, these scholars have not considered the 
relationship between judicial election scheduling and voter 
turnout.
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The performance of the variable campaign spending in 
this analysis alrc has important policy implications. The 
explanatory power of this variable in the general model 
suggests that candidates who are able to raise or attract 
large campaign expenditures are more likely to stimulate 
voter turnout. Candidates with the availability of funds 
are able to increase the salience of judicial elections by 
spending more on informing the electorate, thus giving 
themselves an electoral advantage as well as an advantage in 
mobilizing voters.
As a result of the important role campaign spending 
plays in the judicial election process, one possible policy 
which may be implemented to aid candidates who are not able 
to raise large sums of campaign spending, to make acquiring 
judgeships more accessible, and to make the electoral 
selection of judges a more democratic process may be to 
place limitations on the amount of money each judicial 
candidate receives from public and other donors. Just as 
expenditure restrictions have been imposed on congressional 
candidates, such restrictions may be necessary in judicial 
elections in light of the crucial role such spending has in 
those elections.
The findings of the present study should allow for the 
mobilization of voters, thus increasing electoral participa­
tion in judicial races. A knowledge of factors which 
increase voter turnout, specifically in judicial elections,
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is very important. The present research reveals that voter 
turnout in judicial elections is affected by the scheduling 
of these elections and by the amount of money spent by the 
candidates. Scheduling judicial contests concurrently with 
high visibility elections and congressional elections in 
addition to placing restrictions on the amount of campaign 
expenditures each candidate may receive may prove to be 
instrumental in mobilizing voters to participate in these 
elections.
Furthermore, those judicial candidates with prior 
judicial experience, who had previously held elective 
office, or were black did stimulate voter turnout. The 
policy ramification of this finding is that if judges are in 
fact representatives and it is in the best interest of 
particular groups (e.g., racial or ethnic minorities) to 
have certain candidates win, then these groups should 
support judicial candidates who are more likely to draw 
voters to the polls. According to the results of this 
analysis, the candidates who are more likely to increase the 
saliency of judicial elections are those with large campaign 
contributions, prior judicial experience, who have held 
elective office, or black candidates.
Similarly, it would be wise for persons belonging to 
the above mentioned groups to support judicial candidates 
particularly in elections held in rural areas and those held 
in districts in which median family income is high. The
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rationale for the above statement is that voter turnout was 
found to be higher in elections held in rural areas and in 
districts consisting of voters with high median family 
income.
In conclusion, the present study is an attempt to 
provide insight into the judicial election process. 
Obviously, much research needs to be conducted to explain 
what is occurring in terms of challenges to state judicial 
elections structures. Scholars cannot limit their research 
efforts to providing mere discussions of lawsuits 
challenging judicial election processes without providing 
some type of critical analysis of the entire situation.
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U.S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Congress, 2d Session 28-29, 
reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative 
News 177, 206-7, which accompanied the bill amending Section
2, noted seven typical factors and two additional factors to
be considered probative of a Section 2 violation.
1. the extent of any history of official 
discrimination in the state or political 
subdivision that touched the right of the 
members of the minority group to register, to 
vote, or otherwise to participate in the 
democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections 
of the state or political subdivision is 
racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political 
subdivision has used unusually large election 
districts, majority vote requirements, anti­
single shot provisions, or other voting 
practices or procedures that may enhance the 
opportunity for discrimination against the 
minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, 
whether the members of the minority group 
have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority 
group in the state or political subdivision 
bear the effects of discrimination in such 
areas as education, employment and health, 
which hinder their ability to participate 
effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been 
characterized by overt or subtle racial 
appeals; and
7. the extent to which members of the minority 
group have been elected to public office in 
the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative 
value as part of plaintiffs’ evidence to establish violation 
are ;
A. Whether there is a significant lack of 
responsiveness on the part of elected 
officials to the particularized needs of the 
members of the minority group; and
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B. Whether the policy underlying the state or 
political subdivision's use of such voting 
qualifications, prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, or procedure is tenuous.
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(1) Incumbency or Prior Judicial Experience**
-Coded 1 = "yes" (Candidates who have previously held
judgeships), O = "no" (Candidates with no judicial 
experience).
(2) Race of Candidate**
-Coded 1 = "Black" 0 = "White".
(3) Campaign Spending
Total campaign spending in each election_____
Voting age population in each district
-Measuring campaign expenditure in this manner controls 
for the impact the size of districts may have on 
candidates’ spending (Dubois, 1980, 1984).
-Finance information was drawn from official documents 
filed by candidates with the Louisiana Campaign Finance 
Off ice.
(4) Prior Elective Office
-Coded 1 = "yes" (Candidates who have previously held
elective offices, excluding judgeships), 0 = "no" 
(Candidates with no prior elective experience).
-This information was drawn from the biographies of 
judges included in The American Bench.
(5) Type of Election**
-Coded 1 = "General" 0 = "Primary".
(6) Age*
-Percentage of total population aged 35 through 69.
(7) Income*
—Median Family Income.
-For districts containing 2 or more parishes, median 
family income was computed as a weighted average of 
family income as a proportion of families in each 
parish.
(8) Education*
-Percentage of persons 18 and over within each district 
who are high school graduates.
(9) White Registered Voters
-Proportion of total registered voters who are white.
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-Measured as follows: # of white registered voters
total registered voters
-This information was provided by the Louisiana Office 
of Secretary of State.
(10) Rural*
-Proportion of total population residing in rural 
areas.
-Calculated as follows: ____________ rural_______________
total population
(11) White-collar Workers*
-Percentage of population over 16 years old employed in 
white-collar occupations.
(12) High Visibility Election***
-Coded: 1 = "yes" (gubernatorial or mayoral election)
O = "no".
(13) Presidential Election***
-Coded; 1 = "yes" (Presidential election occurring)
0 = "no".
(14) Congressional Election***
-Coded: 1 = "yes" (U.S. Senatorial election occurring)
0 = no.
(15) Competition**
Total votes received by the winner minus the total 
votes received by the runnei— up as a proportion of the 
total votes cast.
-The lower the percentage, the more competitive the 
election.
(16) Black Median Family Income*
-For districts consisting of 2 or more parishes, black 
family income was calculated as a weighted average of 
black median income as a proportion of black families 
in each parish.
*This information was taken from data collected by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce publication Census of 
Population.
**This data was drawn from the data compiled by Professor
Ronald E. Weber (1988) as an expert witness in Clark v . 
Edwards.
**This information was obtained by using the Almanac of 
American Politics.
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CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE SUMMARY
Parish and/or District ______________  Office Sought _________
Date of Primary  _______________  Date of General _____________
Expenditure Expenditure 
Candidate Period During Period Aggregating
180th Day Prior
to Primary
90th Day Prior
to Primary
30th Day Prior
to Primary
10th Day Prior
to Primary
10th Day Prior
to General
40th Day After
General
Annual Report
Supplemental
Report
Annual Report
Supplemental
Report
Annual Report
Supplemental 
Report
Period
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